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The necessity for merchant ship self protection has
become more and more obvious during recent years. This
thesis will investigate the threat (missiles and mines) and
associated counter-measures that might be installed to
provide a reasonable degree of protection. The results
indicate that it is possible to get protection against a
sea-skimming missile with a combination of ECM and ESM
deployed aboard the ship. For protection against the mine
threat, a sonar is designed in order to give the ship enough
warning time to make an avoiding maneuver. The sonar
investigation indicates the difficulty in designing a sonar
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The increase in threat technology since world war two
has been alarming. A threat of particular concern to world
navies is the anti-ship missile. Computer programmed,
multi-sensor guided, multi-platform delivered missile
systems, aimed at over-the-horizon targets are very
effective against the warships for which they are designed.
A second threat, of less sophisticated technology but
nevertheless of good effectiveness against warships, is the
mine. Mines can be deployed by all kinds of platforms and
can also be designed for various purposes. However, as
recent events have clearly demonstrated, anti-ship missiles
and mines are also devastating against unarmed merchant
ships. As a result, countries depending on maritime trade
need to enhance their self -protection capabilities.
A merchant ship needs self -protection in two specific
situations. First, when transiting through a defined "war
zone" area and second, when used for logistic support of a
military operation. Both of these situations occurred in the
Falkland war in 1982 and again in the Persian Gulf war in
1985 through 1988. If the merchant ships involved in these
operations had been equipped with some kind of
self -protecting systems, many political, economic and
tactical advantages would have been realized.
Over the past 30 years there have been significant
changes in the size, appearance and general characteristics
of ships engaged in international commerce. The design and
construction technology through the period have accelerated
this development and given us new types of ships with the
ultimate goal of increasing ton-miles per day at maximum
profit. Containerships, barge carriers, RO/ROs (Roll On Roll
Off) and liquefied gas carriers are some of the newcomers
which are operating worldwide. Few in number, they are
relatively large, fast, and employ the latest technology.
Tankers and other bulk carriers have been in service for
many years and their numbers, size and power have grown
dramatically. Although participating in worldwide
operations, the immense size of some classes limits them to
terminal ports and routes. Oil, or oil derivatives, are a
vital product for practically all developed countries so
that the transportation of these products has resulted in a
large number of ships of all sizes; from small coastal
tankers to VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) of over 500,000
dwt
.
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Figure 1. Deepsea tanker sizes by delivery date
The yearly world oil production today (1989) is estimated
to be around 3 billion tons and is increasing. Of this, 1
billion is transported in tankers. With an estimated 60% of
the world reserves located in the Middle East, the demand
for tankers will likely increase.
Today, the tanker fleet consists of 2,500 large ships
(over 10,000 dwt) and represents a capacity of 230 million
dwt. In addition, there are 280 ships capable of carrying
both oil and/or ore and approximately 4,000 small coastal
tankers.
B. DISCUSSION
To maximize profits, shipowners^ are making great
efforts to reduce expenditures. The cost of acquiring
self-protecting systems for a tanker must be weighed against
the potential cost savings. That is, are the costs resulting
from loss of life or property versus the cost savings from a
reduction in insurance premiums, enough to offset the costs
of the self-protection systems?
Considerations other than hardware acquisition will also
affect the overall cost of the self -protecting systems. For
example, do the self-protection systems need to have an
operator or operators? Or is training of current crew
members an option? What about maintenance? Portability?
Having to hire additional, specially educated and trained
personnel to operate and care for the equipment adds a great
deal of cost to the life cycle of the systems. Therefore,
the systems must be easy to operate and maintain. Since the
tanker does not always have to transit "war zones" to get to
its destination, and must keep its time in port to a
minimum, the necessary equipment should be easily installed
and removed.
C. OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS
The focus of this thesis will be to:
* Examine the use of Electronic Warfare support in
reducing the anti-ship missile threat.
* Give design parameters for a mine hunting sonar system
in order to reduce the mine threat.
The thesis will first study the threat and merchant ship
characteristics. It will then study the EW system(s)
possibilities that can provide a degree of protection, and
give guidelines and suggestions for further investigations.
The thesis will subsequently continue with a mine hunting
sonar design procedure, where design parameters will be
determined based on outlined mission and technical
assumptions and specifications.
In pursuing the objectives, the following constraints
will be considered:
* A scenario paralleling the Persian Gulf experiences
of neutral shipping, transiting through defined "war
zones," will be used.
* The threat consideration will be a "generic" radar
guided missile and a "generic" mine.
* The EW support and Mine hunting sonar design
characteristics must be relatively inexpensive,
easily installed and removed, nearly autonomous or,
if not, very "user friendly."
The merchant ship is operating alone.
EW protection will be limited to ESM and ECM support.
The Acoustic Counter Measure (ACM) will be limited to
the design of a high frequency mine hunting sonar,
mounted on the bow of the ship.
The sonar hardware design and transducer theory(except beam forming) will not be covered.
The sonar design environment will be limited to a
specific area in the Baltic sea.
II. TARGET SCENARIO
A. TARGET CHARACTERISTICS
Besides the fact that ship sizes have been getting
bigger, even the ship proportions have changed
significantly. Length to beam ratios are now typically 5.5
to 6.5, where previously they were in the 7.5 range. The
draft has also increased and has actually made it impossible
for the largest ships to operate normally in almost all
ports of the world. Careful planning is necessary to
determine how best to accomplish the assigned mission within
the unique constraints of each port. In many cases the ship
or ships have to be unloaded outside the port by smaller
tankers. [Ref. 2]
Although a "standard" tanker will be used throughout the
thesis, other tanker dimensions will be considered as
appropriate
.
The reference tanker has the dimensions shown in Figure
2. [Ref. 2]
Appendix A shows the general arrangement of typical
"reference" tanker.
B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
During transit through a "war zone" one can assume that
the bridge is manned with at least three persons: one duty
officer, one steersman (no automatic steering during war
zone transit) and one look-out. The alert level is high at
all times. One can also assume that the ship has at least
one X band and a C band radar.
The ship cargo tanks and the bow area are unmanned when
operating at sea. They are also the most insensitive part of
the ship to missile attack. Since crude oil has low
^A
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Length in meters 330
Beam in meters 50
Depth in meters 25
Draft in meters 20
Speed in knots 16
HP (horse power) 30,000
Propulsion Steam
Light ship in tons 30,000
Deadweight in tons 250,000
Displacement in tons 280,000
Length/Depth 12.8
Length/Beam 6.3
Figure 2. Profile of tanker
inflammability, it is unlikely that the oil will be ignited
by missile impact. Consequently, if it is impossible to
avoid the missile, this is the least vital part of the ship
to have hit. The zone extends through approximately
three-fourths of the ship's length. If the vital one-fourth
can remain relatively undamaged, the VLCC may be able to
proceed to the nearest "friendly" port.
Even if a VLCC is capable of withstanding several missile
hits without sinking, there are still strong political
reasons to protect the ship. The recent situation with
United States' involvement in the Gulf War of 1988 is a good
example
.
In spite of their size, the VLCCs are occasionally
operating in narrow straights and close to shore. This leads
to a situation where a missile can be launched from the
shore. This thesis will look at both the open sea case,
whether the missile is fired from an aircraft or a ship, and
the shore case.
C. PERFORMANCE
This section discusses ship maneuverability limits and
the consequences for missile avoidance. It should be obvious
that a VLCC is not designed for fast maneuvers or speed
changes. However, the vertical semicylindrical bow shape
resulting from a tanker's low speed/length ratio, lowers
water resistance and improves propeller efficiency (Figure
2). The resulting ship stability gives the tanker more
maneuverability than its size might indicate.
Table 1 shows maneuvering data for the reference target
[Ref . 3] :
TABLE 1. MANEUVERING DATA FOR REFERENCE TARGET
Crash stop ahead test
(full load condition)













Given a nominal speed, for both open-ocean and in-shore
situations, of 16 knots (together with the performance
characteristics above), it takes around 20 minutes for a
fully loaded tanker to stop. If the tanker is in ballast, it
will require only about 14 minutes.
With a maximum rudder deviation (35 degrees port or
starboard) and a 16 knot speed, the angular turning velocity
is 0.7 degrees/second. Therefore, the time required to turn
the ship's head 90 degrees is 2.5 minutes in ballast
condition, and is estimated to be 3 . minutes when fully
loaded.
These results indicate that to use "speed changes" to
deceive an incoming missile is not effective. However, in
some situations, a tanker at full speed can reduce the
missile's approach angle significantly, within the missile's
flight time, by applying the appropriate full rudder
deviation. This is naturally dependent on what kind of
indication and warning (I&W) the ship has available.
D. RADAR CROSS SECTION (RCS)
The quantitative measure of the ratio of power density
of a radar wave scattered from a target, to the power
density in the radar wave incident upon the target, is
called the radar cross section (RCS) of the target.
It is assumed that the target is in the far field, i.e.,
when the target is sufficiently far from the antenna so that
the incident wave upon the target is approximately planar.
In this case, the radar cross section can be defined as
independent of range to the target. [Ref . 4]
The RCS dimensions are generally expressed as unit square
meters. This convention will be used throughout this thesis.
To get correct values for a target's RCS is very
difficult. There are formulas to calculate theoretical RCS
areas for a number of standard shapes, but when the targets
get more complex, such as with aircraft and ships, there are
no simple relationships to use.
The RCS of complex targets are further complicated by the
viewing aspect and the radar frequency. The target comprises
a number of independent shapes and objects which scatter
energy in all directions. The relative phases and magnitudes
of all the scattering shapes contribute differently at the
receiving antenna and give a varying RCS area as the target
shifts in orientation, moves or the viewing aspect is
changed.
The theoretical approach to defining RCS relates incident
to reflected electromagnetic fields and is shown below as
[Ref . 4] :
2
= lim4 T- R
R --> CO
where o = RCS
R = Distance between radar and target
E
r
= Reflected field strength
E: = Strength of incident field at target
An easier and probably better way of plotting RCS is to
measure the real target in the real (at sea) environment.
Another way is to break up a complex target into a number
of simple geometrical shapes, for which we know the
scattering behavior, and then to compute the sum of their
individual contributions to the whole-target RCS.
A VLCC tanker is considered to be a complex target.
Unfortunately, there is no reliable RCS data available,
using the approaches described above. Therefore, the only
option is to use a simple empirical expression. This
expression assumes a ship target at a shallow grazing angle,
to obtain an average RCS. This means the expected maxima
about the port and starboard sides are averaged downward,
and the resulting value is a median (50th percentile) RCS.
The RCS formula to be used is shown below and was derived
from measurements made at X, S and L bands for ships from
2,000 to 17,000 tons. If the formula is valid outside this
size and frequency range, it will give us the numbers shown
below for the X and the K band radars. [Ref . 4]
o = 52 * F^/^ * Yr*
^
where o = RCS in m
F = Frequency in MHz
D = Ship's (full load) displacement in kTon
Calculation: for X band radar = 24 million m
2for K band radar = 33 million m
These numbers are grossly in error when compared with
collected data from other kinds of ships.
The effective radar cross section for the reference
target is finally estimated to be 100,000 sm average value,
valid at all aspect angles and under both loaded and
unloaded condition [Ref. 3]. This estimation is a compromise
of empirical and measured data. This is a very crude picture
of the reality. For example, there is a significant RCS
difference depending on whether the ship is exposed from the
broad side or from the stern. The fact that the maxima are
quite narrow in angle, however, makes this a special case
that can be utilized by an attacking missile only if the
ship is unable to react quickly enough.
As mentioned above, the cross section area of a target in
motion is almost never constant. The variations may be
caused by meteorological conditions, the lobe structure of
the antenna pattern, equipment instabilities or relative
10
motions of radar and target. The variations due to a complex
target's cross section fluctuations with viewing angle are
considered to be the most sensitive parameters and must be
taken into account.
The easiest and the most economical method for making
adjustments for this is to use the Swerling models (Table
2), where it is possible to adjust the detection
probabilities is terms of four different fluctuating models
of cross section. [Ref. 6]
TABLE 2. FLUCTUATION MODELS
Slow target Fast target
fluctuation fluctuation
Many reflectors
of same size model 1 model 2
One dominant
reflector model 3 model 4
In our case, model 3 is the most adequate. A tanker is a
relatively "clean" target, considering its superstructure
(that is, few small reflectors), so the whole ship is
basically one dominant reflector. Further, the missile radar
is typically a tracking radar where the number of radar
returns is large and the RCS area fluctuation is slow.
E. SELF NOISE STUDY
Noise generated by the platform engines and movement
through the water, etc., complicates the sonar detection
1/2process. This self noise is measured in dB re 1 y. Pa/Hz ' .
Self noise is entered in the sonar equation as an equivalent
omni-directional noise spectrum level (NSL(A) ) . The NSL(A)
11
and NSL(S) are competitive, and if one dominates (over 10
dB) the contribution of the other is negligible. [Ref • 7]
The objective will be to determine the major noise
sources of the VLCC tanker and further give an estimation of
the NSL(S) at the sonar location. The assumption for the
discussion is that the tanker is transiting a war zone with
a speed of 16 knots. No measured NSL(S)s for a tanker of
this size and high sonar frequencies have been found in the
literature.
The most significant noise causes in a ship can be
depicted as seen in Figure 3. [Ref . 8]
The general rule is that self noise tends to increase
with the increasing speed of the platform. Further, the
relative importance of the different noise sources can be
seen in Figure 4. The figure shows the areas where the
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Figure 4. Regions of
dominance of the sources
of self noise
Other important considerations when estimating the self
noise are the location and mounting of the sonar, together
with the search sector. The fact that the purpose of the
sonar is to detect a stationary mine in a limited sector and
in a forward direction reduces the self noise considerably.
The sonar is deployed in the front part of the ship and will
never point in a direction (astern) where most of the noise
sources are located. Further, the high freguency noise
spectrum levels in general are relatively low even at high
speed.
Self noise can take different paths on its way to the
sonar as shown by Urick in Figure 5 below. [Ref . 9]
Path A is a path where the noise is propagating entirely
in the hull of the ship. In path B the noise is propagating
directly from the noise source to the sonar. Path C is a
reflecting path where the noise is reflected to the sonar by
volume scatterers in the sea (like reverberation) and
finally, path D is a bottom reflecting path. Path B is of
minor importance in this case, since the sonar is screened






Figure 5. Self noise paths on surface ship
The following three noise contributors are the most




* flow over hull (flow noise or boundary layer
turbulence)
1. Propulsion machinery:
The propulsion machinery comprises a steam engine with
30,000 HP, reduction gears, drive shafts and bearings, etc.
The noise originates from dynamic unbalances in the systems
resulting in oscillating and friction forces. These forces
transform into sound and vibrations and are transmitted
through the hull into the water and also through the
structures (path A) toward the sonar. The sound frequencies
are typical narrowband tonals imbedded in a broadband
component (see Figure 6). The tonals are caused by the
oscillating forces and are occurring at the same rotational
frequencies (and their harmonics) of the systems involved.





Figure 6. Example of
broadband and narrowband
components of a ship
signature
Sound propagating through the structure of the ship
(path A) will be heavily attenuated on its way to the sonar.
According to Kohlman and Plunt [Ref. 11], the sound will
attenuate on the average of 0.8 dB per frame. For a 300 m
path length, containing 125 frames, this gives an
attenuation of 100 dB . The source strength in an engine room
is assumed to be well below 125 dB re 1 n Pa based on data
regarding noise control in ships [Ref. 8]. Therefore, we can
conclude that the sound factor in path A can be excluded
from the noise contributors. Sound can still be transmitted
through the hull and into the ocean and eventually reach the
sonar using path C and/or D. This acoustic energy, however,
is typically in the lower freguency range and is more or
less overcome by the much more significant propeller noise.
Vibration is a more complicated problem to analyze.
The major vibrations originate from the machinery, propeller
shaft and propeller, but they also originate when ocean
waves strike the ship as it moves forward. The hull is
vibrating with vertical, longitudinal, horizontal and
torsion vibrations. Other vibrating parts are panels,
superstructures, the engine room and the rudder. Vibrations
can be reradiated out by the hull and cause noise. It may
also cause vibrations on the mounting of the sonar which is
a severe problem. [Ref. 9]
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To theoretically estimate the impact of vibrations in
terms of some kind of noise spectrum level is extremely
difficult and will not be attempted in this thesis. It is
assumed that the design of the sonar hardware, together with
an adequate mounting technique dampens out most vibrations.
Using chock suspensions and making the sonar hardware
resonance frequency higher than the excited vibration
frequencies are some of the actions that can be taken.
2. Propulsors
The major propulsor that produces acoustic noise in
the ocean is the propeller (propeller noise). Propeller
noise consists mainly of cavitation by the rotating
propeller blades and "singing." Cavitation develops when
bubbles behind the propeller blades rapidly collapse. This
produces a broadband acoustic noise signal. The cavitation
noise decreases with depth and increases with propeller
rotation speed. The "singing" phenomena is emanating from
the vibrational excitation of the propeller blades when
water is flowing around them. This builds up tonal
components in the broadband cavitation spectrum. [Ref . 10]
The high design frequencies considered and the long
path length (300m) from the propeller to the sonar location
are factors that, even in this case, help to reduce the
noise. Figure 7 shows a typical propeller cavitation
spectrum. [Ref. 12]
An estimation of the source level at a distance of 1 m
from the propeller in the audible frequency band (100 Hz to
10 kHz) can be made by the following formula:
SSL v< K+10 log(B*D4 *N 3 *f" 2 ) dBre Ifi bar
where K = 63 (conventional propellers)
D = Propeller diameter in m
N = Revolution rate per second
f = Frequency in Hz





























Figure 7. Typical propeller cavitation spectrum
This gives for D = 7 m, N = 3 rev/s, f= 10 kHz (upper
limit) and B = 4 , an estimated SSL of 37 dB re
1/7
1 \i bar/Hz ' . The level is then decreasing with -3 dB per
octave which gives
37 -10 dB= 27dB re l|abar/Hz 1/2
or
27 + 100= 127 dB re l|aPa/Hz 1/2 at 100 kHz
The transmission loss (TL), with an assumption of
spherical spreading, a worst case path length (Path B) of
300 m and an absorption coefficient a=0.02 dB/m gives at the
sonar location [Ref. 12]
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TL = 20 log R + a*R = 50 + 6 = 56 dB re 1 Pa
The SSL at the sonar location then yields 71 dB re
1/2
1 |a Pa/Hz '
. However, even if this is a significant SSL the
screened-off sonar makes the noise contribution negligible.
The propeller noise will consequently not give a significant
noise contribution. The "singing" overtones might still show
up in the sonar receiver bandwidth, but it is assumed that
this is not very likely to occur. Even if they show up they
can easily be removed by using "notch filters."
Cybulski [Ref . 13] shows measurements of the noise
spectrum levels (NSL) from a VLCC tanker (dead weight of
271,000 tons) at a speed of 16 knots. The measurements were
performed in a low frequency band (2 to 80 Hz), abeam at a
distance of 360 meters. At 10 Hz the NSL was measured to
about 175 dB re 1 |jl Pa/Hz 1 / 2 . The slope of the measuring
curve goes negative at higher frequencies and the fall rate
is about -11 dB/octave. This means that the NSL at 100 kHz
is estimated to be (13 octaves * 11 dB ) 143 dB re 1
HPa/Hz1/2 . This leaves 32 dB re lp Pa/Hz 1/2 at 100 kHz,
assuming the slope rate holds through the entire frequency
spectrum. Again, since the sonar is only looking in a very
limited angle ahead and never astern, the propeller noise
contribution can still be assumed negligible.
3. Flow over hull noise
The most significant "flow over hull noise" source is
the "boundary layer turbulence" or "flow noise." Flow noise
is generated in the turbulent part of a boundary layer. A
boundary layer is developed between the hull and a
transitional flow of water when the ship is propagating
through the water. It is defined as the region where the
fluid viscosity is present and it extends from a zero flow
velocity at the hull out to 99% of the free stream velocity.
[Ref. 14]
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Figure 8 shows a ship model propagating in the water
with its boundary layer. Note that the transition point
depends on the size of the ship, speed and smoothness of the
hull, etc. [Ref. 14]
Figure 8. Example of boundary layer on ships
The actual noise is produced by fluctuating pressure
patches in the turbulent boundary layer. These give rise to
a fluctuating noise voltage at the output of a pressure
transducer. [Ref. 9]
The importance of flow noise increases as the speed
increases and becomes, in many cases, the major contributor
to the self noise [Ref. 15]. In order to reduce the flow
noise the following actions can be taken: mount the sonar
right at the bow of the ship (this is a stagnation point
where the flow separates and the boundary layer is absent);
make the transducer size large; and use a dome that
surrounds the sonar.
The first two actions are self-evident in this
particular sonar design, since the mines are deployed in a
forward direction and the beam widths must be narrow (which
normally implies a large transducer). Using some kind of
housing or dome is a very beneficial action, since a dome
reduces the whole self noise picture. It reduces the
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turbulent flow and hull cavitation and provides space
between the transducer and the flow noise. It is evident
that a sonar dome must be used, mounted on the bow of the
ship as an extension of the bow-bulb. This limits the
flow-noise contributors to the flow-noise surrounding the
sonar dome.
Several measurements have been done in the effort to
estimate the flow noise NSL of different bodies. Urick [Ref
.
6] gives NSL values for a transducer located in a buoyant
body and propagating in water at different speeds. According
to these measurements, an extrapolated NSL of 30 - 40 dB re
1 ^ Pa/Hz 1 / 2 is given at 100 kHz. Note that there is a
major size and shape difference between the experimental
body and the real sonar dome, though.
Skudrzyk and Haddle [Ref. 15] gives measurements from
an experiment with a rotating cylinder placed in a so-called
"Garfield Thomas Water Tunnel." For a value of £ =0.14
( £ = the nondimensional displacement thickness of the
boundary layer at 16 knots. The reference indicates that the
boundary layer thickness % = 5 *£*) and f = 100 kHz, these
measurements give a NSL of about 60 dB re ly Pa/Hz x/ .
There is a significant difference between the results
of the two measurements, which is not surprising since the
assumptions and experimental configurations are different.
However, the experimental set up is more applicable in this
case, even if the measured body is different. Hence, the
values given by Urick [Ref. 9] are probably more accurate to
use in this case.
The NSL in the high frequency part of the spectrum is
also highly influenced by the surface roughness and
smoothness. [Ref. 15] The more grit and/or rust at the
surface, the more noise is generated. Since the sonar system
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is only deployed for a limited time, a reasonable assumption
is that the sonar dome is always clean and smooth during
operation.
5. Conclusion:
The elimination of many noise sources has been
possible because of the nature of the design problem. The
only noise source that makes a significant impact is the
flow noise. Use of a sonar dome to decrease the flow noise
is necessary. The design of such a sonar dome is beyond the
scope of this thesis, but the design reguirements are
severe, in order to decrease both the flow noise and the
internal losses.
In order to get a specific number for the NSL the
measurements by Urick [Ref. 9] are probably the most
reliable to use. An upper limit value of 40 ^ Pa/Hz 1 / 2 is
chosen to be the ship's NSL(S) in this particular sonar
application. This upper limit value is assumed to take care
of the body size scaling in the experiment and also account
for other small noise contributions.




1. Definition of the threat
As mentioned earlier, the missile threat utilized in
this thesis is a surface-to-surface or an air-to-surface
missile (SSM/ASM) whose launch platforms include a ship,
submarine, airplane or missile batteries ashore. Although
both missile types have been available for approximately 40
years, it was not until they had been used in a battle, such
as the war between Israel and Egypt in 1967, that their
effectiveness was firmly established. As a result of this
demonstration and technical development, very
cost-effective, capable systems have entered the inventories
of almost all countries having military forces.
The most applicable missiles used against a surface
target are the "sea skimmers," most threateningly those with
long stand-off or over-the-horizon capabilities [Ref. 16].
These missiles are designed to fly just above the ocean
surface to make them more difficult to detect, apply ECM or
shoot down. To achieve long stand-off distances the
missile's trajectory toward the target is usually separated
into three phases.
First comes the boost phase where the missile is
separated from the host carrier, usually to a high altitude.
Then comes the midcourse phase where the missile is guided
with some kind of passive navigation system and also
descends to low altitude at some point in the phase. In this
phase the goal is to avoid any kind of electro-magnetic
radiation to prevent detection. The third phase is the
terminal guidance phase where the missile utilizes its
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tracking radar system to get close enough to the target
for proper fuze operation and target damage.
Some of the guidance methods being used are pure
inertial navigation, active mapping by radar or just
straight dead reckoning. To keep the altitude stable during
the terminal phase, some sort of altimetry is used. Since
the missile is flying at relatively low altitudes, a low
power FM/CW radar altimeter using very short wavelengths can
be employed. The FM/CW radar radiates a frequency modulated
CW signal having a periodic baseband modulation waveform.
Another common altimeter is the pulsed radar with a narrow
pulse (0.002 to 0.003 microseconds). Alternatively, a low
power laser can also be used, which is jam resistant and
more difficult to intercept because of the narrow beam and
suppressed sidelobes. A typical missile trajectory is shown
in Figure 9 [Ref . 17 ] .
Figure 9. Example of missile trajectory
Prior to the phases described above, the launch
platform performs an acquisition cycle where it initially is
trying to locate the target. This can be done using external
resources or from the platform's own sensors. To draw
conclusions during this cycle, such as that a missile launch
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against one's ship is imminent, needs both sophisticated ESM
equipment and well-trained personnel. Neither are available
onboard our reference ship, hence this acquisition cycle
will not be further investigated.
2. Design principles
There are many ways of estimating an enemy's threat
capability. One method is to determine his electronic order
of battle (EOB). This means that enemy targeting-systems
capabilities are determined through intelligence efforts.
Historically, the intelligence community has been unable to
obtain totally objective information on enemy capabilities,
resulting in a tendency to underestimate (or overestimate)
the threat. Another approach is to assume the enemy has the
same capability that ones own country has, and which you
therefore know quite accurately. Finally, the third
technique is to use a generic design approach, where the
optimum theoretical threat parameters are estimated. Both of
the latter methods have a tendency to overestimate the
threat. Since this is an unclassified thesis, the approach
will be a mix of the two latter methods, but the generic
method will be emphasized [Ref . 18] .
Although many missile seeker configurations are
possible, this thesis will only consider a radar guided
missile
.
Radars, designed for missile seekers, are often a form
of specialized tracking radar whose function is to provide
high data rate guidance information to the missile's control
surfaces. Neither the common tracking nor surveillance radar
designs provide the data rates required. Because the missile
seeker utilizes a narrow beamwidth antenna, more power is
placed on target. The problem with a radar mounted in the
nose of a missile is that the size of the antenna aperture
must be small, on the order of 12 to 40 cm in diameter, and
the capacity to generate high transmitter power is limited.
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These design considerations must be traded off with the
atmospheric attenuation factors which become more
significant as the frequency increases and the flight
altitude decreases. In general, at low altitudes , the radar
efficiency falls off above X-band at a rate inversely
proportional to frequency.
The missile seeker design has significantly improved
in the last few years. A modern missile seeker is provided
with digital processing, frequency agility, selectable
search patterns and modes, target choice logic (to select
the most important ship in a ship formation) and
considerable ECCM capabilities . [Ref. 17]
The missile seeker ECCM features become vital during
the missile terminal phase, when the radar seeker becomes
active. At this point, the missile's presence becomes known
and susceptible to CM employed by its intended victim.
Therefore, different ECCM methods must be considered to get
a jam resistant missile. Some of the terminal homing schemes
that can be applicable are as follows:
* Active radar with TV scan. The TV scan can be used as
a kind of target identification device where a stored
target picture is correlated with the real time TV
scan.
* ARM. An anti-radiation missile whose mission and
design are focused only on destroying specific
emitters, according to their signature.
* HOJ capability. This is a missile seeker
counter-measure designed to destroy the source of thejamming. It is similar to an ARM but less fussy as to
signature identification.
* Command guided missiles. Passive homing on reflected
target signals from a radar illuminator or designator
in the area
.
In future missile designs one can also expect further
improvement in seeker systems including multi-guidance
modes, multi-sensors and improved target discrimination
capability. [Ref. 19]
25
The missile design characteristics to be considered in
this thesis are [Ref. 20]:
* missile dimensions
* missile aerodynamic performance
seeker performance (power, scan, pulse type, ECCM,
The following sections in this chapter will determine
the parameters of a generic missile that will be used as the
threat reference in the thesis. Some of the parameter
definitions will be broad in order to provide the
opportunity to conduct performance impact analysis.
3. Dimensions and performance
The dimensions of modern sea-skimming ASM/SSM
missiles do not vary much between designs. One possible
explanation is that the same missile type can be fired from
different weapons platforms. Based on unclassified sources,
the parametric values for the generic missile discussed in
this thesis are listed in Table 3:
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Figure 10. Missile flight profile
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Potential missile seeker characteristics will be
defined as outlined in this chapter's section on design
principles. The parameters chosen correspond, in essence, to
what is operational today.
The missile seeker has two modes: the search mode and
the tracking mode. In the search mode the antenna scans a
specified sector while the seeker is trying to decide which
echo to track. The seeker processor sorts out the incoming
echoes and, based on predetermined logic and inertial
measurements, decides which echo is the "best" target
choice. Once radar tracking lock-on is achieved, radar
tracking data is used to guide the missile to the chosen
target. As the missile continues inbound to the target, the
antenna continues to scan and provides the processor with
updated target position data. New targets in its field of
view are evaluated to determine if there is a better target
choice. If the processor finds a "better" target choice, it
may switch over to the new one, depending on design.
27
a. Radar search mode:
The missile seeker search mode is by active pulsed
radar, utilizing either a fixed frequency or frequency
agility operating in the X-band or K-band, depending on the
design range of the terminal phase. Having a short terminal
phase in future seekers is desirable to reduce the ECM
threat. In addition, frequencies above the X-band will
improve data accuracy. Short terminal phase also means short
reaction time for the target. Future missiles may start
their terminal phase at ranges close to 5 km, which results
in a reaction time of approximately 15 seconds (assuming a
mach 1 missile). [Ref. 16]
The search radar is not designed to have a big
tanker as its primary target. It is more plausible to assume
that the radar is optimized for a naval combatant such as a
destroyer or a frigate. The radar parameters listed in Table
4 are therefore estimated against those targets.
Figure 11 shows the radar beam with range
resolution, and Figure 12 shows the missile scan.
b. Radar tracking mode:
The antenna performs a horizontal sector scan as
shown in Figure 12. The seeker makes the decision which echo
to track in a predetermined way that can be either manually
preselected or selected by artificial intelligence. In
short, the first echo meeting the programmed target
characteristics will initiate the tracking mode.
c. Tracking parameters:
The range tracking technique is a split-gate system
that compares the duration of the echo in two times gates.
The time difference is a measure of the gate's location
compared with the echo pulse. Each time gate is 0.2
microseconds in duration.
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TABLE 4. PARAMETERS OF SEARCH RADAR
•
Radar parameters:
Radar type: pulsed, active radar
Frequency: fixed within 8-10 GHz
Bandwidth: 10 MHz
PRF: 4 KHz + 400 Hz
pseudo random hop
Power: 30 KW
Noise fig: 9.0 dB






























The tracker is assumed to be centroid, that is,
homing is on the central part of the echo pulse. This
central part need not be the center of the ship itself.
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Figure 12. Scan top view
d. ECCM capability
In electronic warfare of today, missile seekers
must continue to remain on target in spite of being subject
to a number of ECM techniques (RGPO, chaff, etc.).
Maintaining the seeker effectiveness in the face of the
changing ECM capabilities is a very costly problem for the
designers, but it is a price that must be paid. As much as
50% of the total cost of a missile system can be traced to
the ECCM features in a well-designed system.
This missile is assumed to be equipped with:




control (AGC) gates to counter




The objective of this section is to determine the
target strength (TS) of a "generic" mine. This parameter is
similar to the radar cross section (RCS) for a radar target
discussed in Chapter 2, and will be an important part in the
sonar equations later.
1. Operational considerations
The sea-mine is a very versatile weapon and is used
by almost all countries with a sea border. Some of the
advantages of mines are:
* They are relatively inexpensive.
* They can be deployed by almost all kinds of platforms(surface ships, submarines, aircraft etc).
* They can be deployed in covert operations.
* They can be tailored to a particular target and
environment
.
* They are mostly uncontrolled as soon as they are
deployed, which implies independence from auxiliary
system( s )
.
The major disadvantage with mines is that it is a
relatively slow and stationary weapon system. To sweep mines
and redeploy them in another area is both time consuming and
dangerous
.
Mines are often deployed in large numbers and in a
pattern. The area that is sown with mines is termed a mine
field. The outer borders of a mine field are normally very
carefully determined, since the deploying country, in most
cases, wishes to use the water area surrounding the mine
field itself. This is not always true, however. There are
examples of covert mine deployments, such as in the Persian
Gulf, where mines were deployed in ship lanes without any
pattern and in vast water areas.
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The conclusion is that mines can be used by any nation
in a conflict and they can show up almost anywhere in a "war
zone.
"
2. Dimensions and performance
There are a great variety of mines worldwide and
their dimensions and performance depend on their purpose,
environment and the kind of carrier they are to encounter.
This thesis will only consider moored proximity mines since
these are the most appropriate in the outlined scenario. The
water area considered has a water depth of 100 m which
excludes bottom mines that normally must have a water depth
of less than 50 m to be effective. Also, contact mines just
beneath the surface are very ineffective and seldom used in
modern mine warfare. Moored proximity mines are built by
many countries and some, of the typical shapes with
measurements are shown in Figure 13 below. Note that the
mine shell can consist of metal, plastic or cellular
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Figure 13. Typical mine shapes and measurements
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The figure also shows an inside view of the mine.
The mine has a very thin shell and the inside contains a
charge, a sensor with electronics and air. The charge weight
is normally 200 kg and the total weight can be around 900 kg
(with anchor) .
Figure 14 shows a deployed moored proximity mine. Note
that the mine depth is approximately 20 m and the proximity
distance is approximately 20 ra. The mine depth is optimized
for surface ships.
Figure 14. Deployed moored
proximity mine
The performance of mines is a highly classified area,
but in general, mines consist of multiple sensors with
programmable microprocessors to select targets and to resist
countermeasures
.
An example of how a mine works is; when a ship comes
in the vicinity of the mine, say a few nautical miles, an
acoustic sensor alerts the mine. If the sound behavior is
"correct," the mine activates a magnetic and/or a pressure
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sensor. If the response(s) follows certain conditions the
mine will detonate.
3. Target strength
When a transmitted sound pulse propagates in the
water and impinges on a discontinuity (target) in the water,
some portion of the incident energy will be reflected back,
toward the transmitter. This reflected energy is called the
echo and is the signal of interest at the receiver location.
[Ref . 7] "The target strength (TS) is defined as the ratio
of the reflected intensity (I
r )
in the receiver direction,
measured 1 m from the effective target center, to the
incident intensity at the same point." [Ref. 10: p. 366]
TS = Ir/I i
The TS depends on the geometry, size and acoustic
impedance of the target. It also depends on the frequency of
the incident signal. In order to get correct TS values the
most adequate way is to measure the particular target under
real conditions. This is not an option in this case,
however. Another possibility is to compare the target with
simple geometrical shapes where TS has been derived. The
problem here is to determine which shape is the most
representative to use, among the shapes shown in Figure 13.
Urick [Ref. 9] gives computed TS values for
quasi-cylindrical mines. These values vary between +10 to
-25 dB depending on aspect angle. This indicates at least
the range and magnitudes of the target strength for a mine.
Further issues that need be discussed to get correct
theoretical TS values are: (1) How much of the incident
energy is absorbed by the mine? (2) What is the target
response if sound is penetrating into the mine? (3) What
kind of resonant effects and vibration modes get excited by
the incident signal and how do these effect the TS?
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In addition, efforts will be made by the deploying
country to reduce the target strength of the mine as much as
possible. Some of the methods that can be used are listed







These techniques are especially applicable at high
frequencies. The frequency choice in this case is in the
high frequency region, so consequently the TS reduction
techniques must be considered.
The discussion above indicates that to determine a
particular TS value for a "generic" mine by theoretical
means is not a viable option. Instead, let's handle the
problem by assigning a target strength of dB reljaPa, and
then use the target strength parameters in a sensitivity
analysis at the end of the design study.
TS = dB re 1 [i Pa
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IV. ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES (ECM)
The basic purpose of electronic countermeasures (ECM)
is to introduce wave forms into a hostile electronic system
which will prevent or hamper the system or its operator from
performing their mission.
One way of subdividing the ECM field is shown in Appendix
G. ECM includes jamming, deception and tactics. [Ref. 18]
Jamming is a deliberate radiation or reflection of energy
with the objective of impairing the deployment of electronic
devices used by a hostile force. Deception is the deliberate
radiation or reflection of energy in an effort to mislead a
hostile force. Tactics include what kind of actions the' ship
commander can perform to support the jamming and deception
ECM. Only techniques that are applicable to the active sea
skimming missile seeker will be covered.
As mentioned earlier, the seeker has two modes and both
can be affected by ECM. In the search mode the missile
seeker is activated at approximately 20 to 30 km from the
target. Given the 100,000 square meter size of the intended
target, the seeker should be able to immediately "lock on"
the target, assuming no other similar targets are in the
seeker's field of view. It would then switch over to the
tracking mode. The time the seeker spends in the search mode
is therefore assumed to be very short. Because the missile
seeker will spend most of its time in the tracking mode, it
is during this part of the flight profile that the seeker is
most vulnerable to ECM. The thesis will focus on the ECM
considerations in this mode.
The main objective for the VLCC tanker is to get the
missile to avoid the target entirely. This includes the case
when the missile misses the target but is sufficiently close
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to initiate the proximity fuze. If an impact is unavoidable,
a secondary objective is to force the missile to impact the
ship at a point having the least effect on operations.
The purpose of this chapter is to come up with different
ECM support that can be effective for the VLCC tanker
described in Chapter 2.
The advantages and disadvantages of the ECM support will
be documented along with the support's feasibility.




Noise or "denial" jamming is divided into spot
noise jamming and barrage noise jamming. In principle, spot
noise jamming focuses a narrow band of noise on the
operational bandwidth of the victim seeker. Barrage noise
jamming is broadband and will effect the operation of
seekers emitting within a wide range of frequencies. Spot
noise jamming requires that the seeker operate at one known
frequency unless swept spot noise is employed. If the seeker
utilizes frequency hopping as an ECCM technique, the jammer
must be able to anticipate the seeker frequency changes to
be most effective. This jammer capability is only completely
effective against seekers using a repeated frequency pattern
which can be anticipated by the jammer's frequency
programming logic. Pseudo-random frequency patterns will
degrade a spot jammer's ability to anticipate and jam.
Having a spot jammer capable of following predictable
frequency hoppers will be expensive, swept spot jamming can
be a good compromise. Barrage jamming can cover the
operating frequency range of the seeker, but there is the
penalty of a reduction in Effective Radiated Power (ERP).
Increasing power has the companion constraints of larger
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size and higher costs. General advantages and disadvantages
with barrage noise and spot noise jammers are in Table 5.
TABLE 5. EVALUATION OF JAMMERS
Advantaaes Disadvantaaes
Spot noise good efficiency; need good
jamming light, small signal-analysis
volume; easy to and skillful







Barrage noise little signal low efficiency,
jamming analysis; simple large weight and
to operate; volume; can
efficient against interfere with
frequency own radar
agility frequencies
Swept spot good trade-off best trade off






The goal of noise jamming is to raise the noise
floor of the missile seeker such that the actual signal is
completely submerged by the interference or confused with
noise impulses randomly appearing in the receiver. [Ref . 20]
The special case of noise jamming called swept
spot jamming, is effectively a combination of barrage noise
jamming and spot noise jamming. It utilizes narrow band
noise that is rapidly swept over a larger frequency band







Figure 15. Wave form for swept spot jamming
The advantage with this method is that many
seeker frequencies can be jammed at the same time. The
disadvantage is that the jamming pulse is received
intermittently, and at a lower rate than the seeker's
received echo pulse and is therefore less then 100%
effective. This kind of jamming can be substantially
degraded by incorporating "Dicke Fix" in the seeker
receiver.
b. Analysis
The target has several ways of utilizing noise
jamming. Some examples are shown below, together with
approximate calculations. All of the values are based on the
reference target seeker in Chapter 3.
The following assumptions are made:
* free space propagation (no multipath)
* no atmospheric attenuation
* no lobe divergence
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Further, a new reacquisition cycle, that is, when
the seeker is changing target, takes approximately one
second. If the seeker loses information only in one
coordinate (i.e., in range), or is acquiring a new target,
the reaction time is on the order of milliseconds.
One part of evaluating the effectiveness of noise
jamming is to mathematically predict burnthrough distance,
power requirements, etc. Figure 16 is used throughout this












Figure 16. Typical jamming situation
Abbreviations that will be used for jamming
calculations are.
Pt : radar transmitted power
Gt : radar maximum antenna gain
Gt j : radar antenna gain in jammer direction
dt : Gt /Gt j antenna side lobe ratio
Bt : radar bandwidth
P.; : jammer power
Gj : jammer maximum antenna gain
Gj t : jammer antenna gain in radar direction
dj : Gj/Gj t jammer side lobe ratio
Bj : jammer bandwidth
40
d g : Bt /B^ bandwidth ratio
<7 : target radar cross section area
Rt : distance radar to target
R-: : distance radar to jammer
X : wavelength
Return power at the pulse reflected from the target
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Jammer power in the receiver (within the receiver
bandwidth) is:
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The general formula for signal to jamming ratio
becomes
:
2 2 2PGctr PGcrRddttj ttjjt
S/J = =
4 4
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Assume that the required signal to jamming ratio (for
given values of P(D) and P(FA)) is S/J min. Assume further
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that this is achieved at the "burnthrough" distance R^,
that is (S/J) = (S/J) min for Rt = Rfa .
(1) Case 1: Self screening jamming. This is the
case when the jammer is located on the target or very close
to it. The case is explained in the analysis graph, Figure
17. The location of the jammer is a very important issue
since the missile, if eguipped with HOJ capability, probably
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Figure 17. Selfscreening jammer analysis graph
Assume a jammer with an antenna gain of 10 dB
and that an (S/J) min ratio of 10 dB is required.
Then the jammer power required for a burnthrough
distance of 600 m (worst case, based on missile
reacquisition cycle and maneuvering capability), and for the
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The jamming power required for spot noise jamming
with the same values as above becomes:
P- = 3.3 KW, where d c = 1
J =
(2) Case 2: Side lobe jamming. In this case the
jammer is external but with approximately the same range to
the. missile as the target (R- = Rt ).
With the same assumptions as above, but with
Gt ^=Gt , dt =l anc* t ^ie seeker side lobe ratio of 15 dB
gives
:
For the barrage noise case, with d^ = l and
dt=15 dB
P • G •<*• d d
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For the spot noise case, P^ = 106 KW
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The small aperture and the low average transmitted
power in the missile seeker generally results in strong
sidelobes. This makes the missile seeker more vulnerable to
sidelobe jamming. [Ref . 18]
The requirements in both cases described above are
fully achievable with today's techniques.
As shown in Chapter 3, the range tracking system
generates two gates. They are . 2 (jl s in duration (that is 60
m) each. The angle tracking resolution (width) depends on
the range to the target and the relationship @ * R, where @
(the lobe angle) is expressed in radians. This relationship
gives the following gate sizes shown in Table 6:
TABLE 6. TRACKING SYSTEM GATE SIZES





When these numbers are compared with the target, it
is clear that the reference VLCC tanker, which measures 330




As stated in Chapter 1, the ECM system must meet
the basic parameters of simplicity, reliability,
effectiveness and low cost. Noise jamming is a very
effective and inexpensive way of denying the missile seeker
target data. Based on information theory, white Gaussian
noise injected into the receiver system provides for the
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most effective jamming. It is statistically impossible for
the seeker to distinguish between this jamming noise and the
noise generated by the receiver itself. So, if the seeker is
exposed to enough high quality, high power noise jamming,
seeker "break lock" is possible. [Ref . 18]
The major problem with any kind of noise jamming is
that the missile seeker, in almost all cases, is equipped
with HOJ capability (that is, it homes on the jamming
signal). This ECCM technique can be utilized by the target
to guide the missile to a dummy target or to an insensitive
part of the target itself. One solution is to tow a jammer
mounted on a small craft behind the ship. There might be a
problem keeping the craft in position due to the wind,
currents and weight of the tow line, etc. A more fundamental
problem is how far behind the target must the craft be towed
to effectively lure the missile from the ship? The technique
can be used both in main lobe and side lobe jamming
depending on the length of the tow line. Another serious
problem arises when the missile is approaching within 45
degrees of the bow or stern. According to the maneuvering
data discussed earlier, there is not enough time to turn the
ship sufficiently to present the craft mounted jammer to the
missile. This situation is natural counter countermeasure
that the launching platform can use against the target.
In the self screening jamming case, the jammer is
located on the target, that is, on the ship itself. One
approach is to mount the jammer in a location that is
prepared for the impact. For example, one tank section in
the front part of the ship can be kept empty with the jammer
mounted on the deck above it. The intent is to attract the
missile so it will do the least amount of damage. However,
the bow/stern missile approach still remains. But, since the
aft section is considered to be the most important part of
the ship, missile impact here must be avoided.
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Ship maneuvering might have an effect in the
selfscreening case. It is probably sufficient to turn the
ship 45 degrees either way to get enough bearing resolution
for the missile to distinguish the jamming section of the
ship. To turn the ship 45 degrees takes approximately one
minute. In this time the missile has flown 18 km. So, given
enough warning, say when the missile is still between 20 to
25 km from the ship, a ship maneuver could solve this
problem.
Given the advantages and disadvantages of noise
jamming discussed above, for a ship with lots of space and
no power restrictions, the choice of which system design to
choose is more a matter of cost. Whether a simple radar
warning receiver (RWR) together with a barrage noise jammer
or a more complex and sophisticated ESM receiver together
with a spot noise jammer is chosen depends on one's
assessment of "cost benefit."
Noise jamming together with a ship maneuver can be
an effective way of solving the main objective.
If the missile seeker is not equipped with HOJ
capability, the missile will get no target information and
will, with very high probability miss the target. Further,
if HOJ capability exists, the missile is deliberately guided
by the jammer to a expendable dummy target or to a
"prepared" section of the ship.
2. Radar Absorbing Materials (RAM)
Different methods have been investigated in the effort
to decrease the RCS area for ships, airplanes, missiles,
etc.
The most important and least expensive method is to
initially construct the ship for a low RCS area. Large metal
surfaces with interior orthogonal corners (corner reflectors
effect) must be avoided. Large RCS areas can also be
obtained from openings such as ducts that create resonance
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effects. Convex spherical and cylindrical shaping of major
surfaces is desirable. The idea is to make the ship into a
scatterer and not a reflector, i.e., produce divergent
reflections for impinging EM waves.
These construction guidelines can be useful in new
ship construction if they don't increase costs to a point
greater than the benefit to be achieved.
Another method used to decrease the RCS area is to
cover the metal surfaces with RAM. This material can be used
for an absorbing or an interfering technique. This could be
used, for example, on surfaces or structures which are
retroref lective. [Ref. 21]
The absorbing coating can be based on rubber, plastic
or ceramic compounds and mixed with absorbing material such
as ferrite or graphite (Figure 18). In the coating, the
incoming electromagnetic radiation energy is transformed
into heat. A one cm thick layer decreases the RCS area to 1%


















Figure 18. Example RAM (absorption)
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The method is expensive and the ship will gain a
considerable weight if all surfaces are coated. There is a
problem with the strength and durability of these coatings.
[Ref. 6]
The reflecting damping material can also be of an
interfering type. The metal surfaces are painted with a
semi-transparent 1/4 wavelength layer, reflecting half and
transmitting half of the energy. The reflected energy is 1/2
wavelength out of phase with the transmitted energy causing
destructive interference shown in Figure 19 [Ref. 6]. The
layer can be designed for any freguency from 400 MHz to 40
GHz and the absorption is around 99%. However, the bandwidth
is narrow and the effect depends on the angle of incidence.
The material is also affected by the sea environment so that
its lifetime is limited. Like the previous method, this is
an expensive technique if a whole ship is to be coated. In
addition, the surface of the ship has to be specially






















Repeater jamming takes a received radar signal,
amplifies it, delays it, amplifies it again and finally
retransmits it. The enhanced echo or "cover" signal received
by the victim radar represents a credible target. The
repeater jammer can be approximately the size of a sonobuoy
(5 inches in diameter, 30 inches long) while the false
target presented can be the size of a ship (the size of the
target depends on how far the jammer is from the victim
radar). A block diagram of the technique is shown in Figure












Figure 20. Example repeater jammer
The advantages with deception jamming are:
no signal analysis required
the jamming procedure can be done automatically
simple operation (jamming signal is the amplified
received signal)
the equipment can be made small and light
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The disadvantages are:
* easy to saturate by other transmitters
* hard to get sufficient isolation between the
transmitting antenna and the receiving antenna.
* unable to reproduce complex wave forms (chirp,
monopulse, e.g.), except when the repeater is
incapable of range deception.
The repeater jammer is more complex [Ref . 18] than
the noise jammer and needs a greater amount of processing
power for its implementation.
The three repeater jamming techniques are:
* velocity gate pull off (VGPO)
* angle gate pull off (AGPO)
* range gate pull off (RGPO)
The range gate pull off (RGPO) is the most useful
technique in this case. VGPO is mainly useful against radars
using doppler or CW techniques. AGPO techniques can only be
applied when angle gates are being used in the missile
seeker
.
The RGPO technique is effective against pulse radar
and the goal is to create a false echo that arrives at the
seeker a little later than the real target echo. The
distance between the missile and the target is then changed
to a false value.
The RGPO technique initially repeats the received
echo with a minimum delay time. The amplitude of the
repeated echo is increased slowly but still with minimum
time delay. This causes the radar automatic gain control
(AGC) to adjust to the stronger echo by reducing the gain.
The real echo amplitude is reduced, causing the seeker to
capture the strong repeated echo instead.
Now, the jammer begins to increase the amount of
time delay in the repeated signal and the range gate
circuitry gradually "walks off" the real target echo. When
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the jamming signal stops, the tracker has no "skin" data in
its range gate and must do a reacquisition cycle.
Since deception is only in range and not in angle,
target reacquisition may be very rapid, in a matter of
milliseconds since the angle information may still be
available.
The best result is achieved with a combination of
the repeater techniques above causing the reacquisition
cycle to be accomplished in seconds, but combining the
techniques is very hard to achieve.
A special case of repeater jamming (blip enhancer
or repeater) is when the signal is intercepted and amplified
as above but is not delayed. This will create a return echo
similar to the target echo and hence, can be used as a
decoy.
b. Analysis
An estimate of the feasibility of using repeater
jamming includes calculations of the system gain and power
requirements. The assumptions and notations made in Table 4
and Figure 16 are used.
The jammer in this chapter is assumed to be on the
target, i.e., the ship. The jammer retransmitted power is
(Figure 16, p. 40)
:
2
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It will be assumed that P - < P ^ max, where P^
max is the maximum power achievable before the amplifier
gets saturated. The missile seeker then receives the
following power from the jammer:
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The seeker receives the following power from the
RCS area of the target:
2
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The J/S ratio after the antenna of the missile
seeker becomes:
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The condition for the jamming to succeed is:
J/S > (J/S) min
where (J/S) min is the smallest jamming signal ratio
necessary to deceive the missile tracker. (J/S) min depends
on what kind of jamming is utilized and what kind of
receiver it shall be used against. The (J/S) min is a very
difficult parameter to estimate.
The following two equalities must be fulfilled for
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If the distance between the jammer and the missile
becomes smaller, the missile radar looks through the jamming
independently of increasing Gt .
For calculations assume the following additional
values
:
(J/S)min = 10 dB
G 4 = 10 dB





p jmax ( at Rt = 670 m ) >' 265 KW
The values above indicate that deception jamming is
a possible technique to use.
c. Discussion
As mentioned earlier, the most effective deception
jamming method is RGPO, due to the generic missile
description chosen for analysis. Since only range deception
can be applied, the effectiveness of the technique is
doubtful when used alone. The reacquisition process becomes
very short and the radar will quickly "lock on" to the
target again after being pulled off.
Another consideration is that the target in this
scenario presents a very high freeboard, especially when
unloaded. Since the missile is programmed to fly
continuously at a very low altitude, if the missile does not
do a "pop up" during its final approach, the range gate pull






Chaff is a passive radar countermeasure . The
"jamming" effect that chaff makes in the radar receiver is
caused by the reflected energy of the active radar
transmitter itself. Chaff is still the most widely used
countermeasure and was first introduced in World War Two.
The material used for chaff today consists of
aluminized glass fibers with a diameter of approximately 0.1
mm. They are easy to disperse, the fall rate is low (0.6
m/s) and the blooming time is fast (in the order of 3-6
sec). [Ref.16]
There are three methods in using chaff to protect
ships against sea skimming missiles. They are:
* the deception method
* the lock-on or dilution method
* the break-lock method
The deception method involves trying to confuse the
search and target acquisition radar by increasing the number
of credible targets in the vicinity of the target. This
method can lead to an initial tactical advantage, but the
"real" target will sooner or later be discriminated from the
chaff clouds. This is not a recommended method to use since
the personnel aboard are limited in their ability to handle
the interception and classification of search and
acquisition radars. Also, the great target size together
with long transiting time and large number of acquisition
radars in the environment makes the method very costly and
impractical to use.
The lock-on or dilution method uses a number of
chaff clouds deployed in a specific pattern around the
target in order to distract the missile seeker ideally
causing it to lock^on the chaff cloud (false target) instead
of the real target. This method is appropriate in the
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missile seeker's search mode. The search mode in this case
though, is assumed to be very short. Together with the great
target size and the same practical problems encountered with
the deception method above, the lock-on method is a poor
choice as well
.
In the break-lock method, the missile has already
locked on to the target and the goal is to seduce the seeker
to lock on to a large chaff cloud deployed within the
seeker's field of view. Once the seeker has locked on to the
chaff cloud, the ship can maneuver out from the cloud (if
the warning time is enough) or use the cloud as an extension
of the ship in order to ensure a "close" miss by the
missile. [Ref . 16]
Because the break-lock method is the only viable
choice, it will be further investigated. It is shown in
Figure 21. [Ref. 16]
Figure 21. The break-lock method
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b. Analysis
The length of the chaff depends on what frequency
band they are supposed to be used against. The largest RCS
area is achieved if the chaff length is around half the
wavelength (0.45 - 0.48 X ) . Their resonance bandwidth is
approximately +10% of the resonance frequency. The RCS area
is also dependent on the incident angle of the
electromagnetic radiation. Since the chaff is randomly
oriented when deployed, an average value for the RCS of each
chaff fiber is [Ref . 6]:
<?
x
= k * X 2
where k depends on the tendency of the chaff to stick
together when released. The k factor is usually between 0.1
to 0.3, and is in this case estimated to 0.15.
The number of chaff fibers necessary to achieve a
particular RCS area is:
n = o / (k * X 2 )
Assume that a chaff cloud of 100,000 m2 is
necessary to get the seeker operating with centr >id tracking
to barely miss the target. This means that the large number
of 741 million chaff dipoles must be deployed. This can be
achieved by, for example, chaff grenades dispersed in a
specific pattern. The blooming time can be made very short
and a reasonable value is around 4 seconds.
This means that a sufficient chaff cloud both in
geometric size and RCS area, can be deployed well in advance
of the missile to adjust its centroid tracking point to a
position just outside the boundary of the real target.
Consequently, the break-lock method is possible to use.
c. Discussion
The special case of the lock-on method described
above is a fast, reliable and fairly inexpensive method to
use.
The problem with chaff, though, is that the wind
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direction and velocity have an impact on the effectiveness
of the chaff cloud. To counter this, two systems can be
deployed: one in the fore and one in the aft of the ship. It
also accounts for the possibility that the chaff cloud moves
in over the target due to the wind. The chaff can be
dispersed by grenades, for example, or some other launching
arrangement. The chaff can be dispersed, taking wind
direction and missile bearing., etc., into consideration.
One chaff grenade might, contain chaff for a 100 m2 RCS
(Philax system). This means that 1,000 such grenades must be
launched from the fore or aft each time there is an
indication of a missile tracking radar. This is practically
impossible to pursue since it will be very expensive in both
launchers and projectiles and there will be a serious
problem of reload. Shipborne launchers capable of producing
20,000 m2 clouds per shot exist (NATO SEA GNAT) and
represent an alternative approach.
A considerably smaller RCS area could be acceptable
if one considers the same option as in the jammer case,
where an impact in an insensitive part of the ship is
acceptable. The fact that the missile seeker prefers a "hot
spot" to home on implies that the chaff cloud still must be
significant
.
In an effort to reduce the chaff cloud, a
combination ECM technique with RGPO, chaff and ship maneuver
can be considered. This technique, however, is based on
ships with relatively high maneuverability and is therefore
not viable in this case.
C. DECOYS
Decoys are mostly thought of as a special kind of
expendable countermeasure used to create false target echoes
or to enhance the signature of a low value target. Decoys
can be deployed by remotely piloted vehicles or simply
launched from the ship. [Ref . 22]
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Decoys can be equipped with jamming and/or deception ECM
features. A selection of the most interesting techniques, as
they apply to this thesis, will be investigated below.
1 . Towed craft
This kind of decoy has been mentioned earlier in the
chapter but will now be further investigated. One way of
getting the missile to home on the craft instead of the real
target is by getting the craft to look like the real target
to the missile radar. That is, to increase the RCS area as
much as possible.
It has been reported [Ref . 22] in the press that towed
barges with corner reflectors have already been used in, for
example, the Persian Gulf War. The purpose was the same then
as it is now: to get the attacking missile's centroid
tracker to "slide off" the real target.
The maximum RCS obtained from a corner reflector







Figure 22. Corner reflector
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A corner reflector with a side (a) equal to 2.1m gives
an RCS of around 90,000 ra 2 (around its symmetry axis )
.
Consequently, a number of corner reflectors would easily
achieve a sufficient RCS area to exceed the real target RCS.
There seem to be both practical and electronic problems with
this approach. Although there are no directly accessible
reports available, some problems can be assumed based on
shiphandling experience. For example, the huge corner
reflectors mounted on the barge deck, act like sails, making
the barge very wind sensitive and unstable. Even with
different kinds of anchors to keep the barge in position,
there will still be many problems. This has the consequence
that the ship has very little influence on where the barge
is positioned when the missile is attacking. This is not
satisfactory for the ship commander.
Instead of a corner reflector, one can use Luneberg
lenses. The formula for RCS is given by the formula [Ref. 6]:
3 4
t d
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where d is the diameter of the lens.
To get the same RCS area as above, a Luneberg lens of
1.8 m in diameter is required. This will take care of some
of the "sail" effect discussed above, but there is another
problem with Luneberg lenses. They must be kept quite clean
from salt and other particles if their high performance is
to be maintained. They are also much more costly.
Another alternative is to put a deception jammer or a
repeater jammer on the barge instead. This has been
discussed previously and gives both a sufficient simulated
RCS area and is also a more practical solution due to the
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environment. Probably the best solution is a combination of
corner reflectors and some kind of jammer, but then the
problem with the large reflectors remains.
The advantages with utilizing a towed craft are:
* No power limitations if supplied from the ship.
* The craft is easy to launch when transiting a war
zone.
* The distance between the craft and the towing ship is
easy to adjust to get maximum "slide off" effect by
the missile tracker. This must be considered together
with shiphandling matters like the tow line, weight,
etc
.
* The raft is operational until it is hit.
* The corner reflectors can be replaced with smaller
Luneberg lenses.
* The detection distance of the missile can be very
short because of the fact that the decoy is already
in position and it is just a matter of directing thejamming device (if not omni-directional ) and turn it
on
.
* Inexpensive technique, since the craft is not wasted
until the missile hits the craft (missile centroiding
extends the craft's lifetime).
The disadvantages are:
* The craft can be very wind and sea state dependent,
especially if huge corner reflectors are being used.
* Problem with maintaining high performance with
Luneberg lenses close to the water surface.
* There might be a problem if the missile is
approaching within 45° of the bow of the ship and
there is not enough time to maneuver.
* If there is an option (not possible in the reference
missile) for the missile launching platform to choose
between centroid tracking or left/right edge
tracking, once the ECM technique with craft is known,
it is easy to change the tracking mode as a counter
countermeasure.
* The missile launching tactics can easily be adapted
to the new situation by changing the launch
direction.
2. Buoys
Expendable buoys equipped with a repeater jammer are
currently under development by contractors in the United
States. These consist of a floating device with a jammer
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mounted on top. A number of buoys are launched when a threat
appears and they immediately start to enhance and repeat
incoming signals while in the water. When the batteries are
discharged, they self scuttle and sink to the bottom.
Since the buoy is very small compared to the craft
discussed above, sea state is an additional environmental
factor to consider. For example, there can be a signal
direction problem due to high wave crests.
The advantages of buoys are:
* Buoys can be easily and quickly launched from the
ship. * H *
* Individual buoys are inexpensive, but if the threat
duration is long, the costs can be high.
* A number of buoys can be used to simulate false
echoes in the missile search mode.
The disadvantages with buoys are:
* The missile intercept and warning must be long enough
to give the target enough time to launch and activate
the buoys
.
* As mentioned above, it might be an expensive
solution
.
* Tactical placement relative to threat and target is
important
.
3 . Rocket decoy
A rocket decoy comprises a rocket with a repeater
jammer. The rocket is launched from the ship in a relatively
high elevation angle. When the highest altitude is reached,
a parachute is unfolded and while the rocket is slowly
descending toward the ocean surface, the repeater jammer is
active and hence, acts as a false-target decoy. Figure 23
shows the "Siren" rocket decoy developed by Marconi Defence
System in the United Kingdom [Ref. 23].
The rocket decoy alternative is very similar to the
previously discussed buoy alternative. The major difference
is that the rocket decoy is very wind sensitive and that the
operating time is limited to the time duration of descent.













Figure 23. The "Siren" rocket decoy
since the wind speed and direction varies with altitude. The
decoy behavior after being launched is therefore very
unpredictable
.
4. Remotely piloted vehicles (RPV)
A small radio controlled drone can be used as an RPV.
It can be launched from the ship deck and after the mission
is completed, land in the ocean to be recovered by the crew.
After recovery, it can be cleaned up and prepared for the
next mission. With a number of drones aboard at least one
can be in the air continuously while the ship is transiting
a hostile area
.
A drone can measure around 3-4 m in length and be
propelled by a jet engine or an ordinary propeller engine.
Each drone can carry a ECM payload of say 15 kg.
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The RCS area of the drone itself is very small, from
0.01 m seen from the nose and the tail, to 10 m from each
broadside. [Ref. 23]
The uses of drones are as follows:
* Carry radar beacons (expendable or mounted on the
drone) to deceive the missile radar in search mode.
* Disperse chaff for deception, lock-on or break-lock
purposes. This is not a viable alternative in this
case, though, since the payload must be very big to
simulate 100,000 sm RCS area.
* Carry jammer (noise) in applications discussed
earlier in this chapter.
The advantages are:
* The drone can be operating far from the ship and can
be moved quickly to an optimum location.
* Different kinds of ECM can be loaded into the drone,
depending on the situation.
The disadvantages are:
The payload (15 kg) is very small.
A special organization is needed aboard the ship to
take care of the drone.
Special guiding equipment is needed.
It is a very expensive system.
D. TACTICS ECM
Tactics ECM is a matter of what the ship commander can
do with the ship in an effort to deceive the missile and/or
combine ship tactics with other ECM.
The most viable tactic in this case is to use ship
maneuvers in combination with another ECM. This has been
discussed in the chapter above.
One way to "hide" the ship using only ship tactics is to
operate the ship so closely to the coast that the coast line
and the ship itself is within the seeker's resolution cell.
However, this tactic is terrain and navigation dependent.
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One obvious consideration for the ship commander is, of
course, to choose the less hostile transiting path through
the war zone. This includes collecting information about
hostile forces and missile batteries ashore, etc.
E. ECM CONCLUSIONS
All of the ECM support techniques described above are
more or less possible to pursue. This section of the chapter
will decide which technique or combination of techniques is
the most viable against the reference missile. To do this,
the expected performance criteria will be defined and then
compared to the available techniques. The technique(s)
selected will provide a new set of options to be evaluated







Comments will be made for each choice of level.
The evaluation is the author's own judgement and is based
on theoretical guidelines and naval experience since no
performance data is readily available.
The following is a list of performance criteria given in
priority order
:
Operational effectiveness. This will answer the overall
question: "Over a given period of time, how well does the
alternative achieve the objective of protecting the ship
from a missile attack?" [Ref . 24] The period of time is in
this case the time the ship is spending in the "war zone."
Risk. This is the risk that vital parts of the ship,




Life-cycle cost. This will include:
* research and development cost
* production and construction cost
* operation and support cost (like personnel and ESM
support)
Reliability. The reliability can be defined as the
probability that the alternative will perform when needed.
"When" is, again, during the war zone transit. Other
considerations include:
* geographic location of the war zone
* day and/or night capability
* weather and sea conditions
Supportability
.
The supportability includes the following
issues
:
* number of personnel needed to maintain a developed
system
* education level of the operating personnel
* training of personnel
* human factors
Transportability. The transportability will include
issues like:
* size and weight
* ease of installation and removal
The main ECM alternatives discussed in the chapter are
listed below. The alternatives are not entirely comparable
but this approach will simplify the decision process.
Combining techniques will be discussed when appropriate.
A. Selfscreen noise jamming (from the ship itself)
B. Deception jamming, RGPO from the ship
C. Chaff in a lock-on method
D. Decoys (includes using part of the ship as a decoy)
E. Radar Absorbing Materials (RAM)
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Alternative A will be excluded from the decision process
since this is not a viable alternative due to the reference
missile being equipped with HOJ capability.
Details are shown in Tables 7, 8, 9, 10.




Positive: * The same jammer can be used alls Medium
the time through the war zone
* Effective against radars with no
human operator involved
* Manage to deceive more than one




With only RGPO the reacqui si t ion
time can be very short
The jammer can be saturated by
other transmitters
Doubtful technique since the
boresight is aimed at the target
Risk High Negative: * The jammer is located aboard the
ship
Life-cycle cost Low Positive: * State of the art technique
Inexpensive system to operate and
support
Reliabi lity High Positive: * The technique has been tested and
operable for many years
Supportabi lity High Positive: * The system can be operated
autonomously
Transportabi lity High Positive: * Low size and weight
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Manage to deceive more than one
incoming missile
Easy to combine with other ECM
technique





Practical problems to achieve
sufficient RCS area for the
reference target
Problems to reload and aid
Launchers
Needs relatively Long warning
time
Risk Medium Negative: * Chaff cloud is dispensed close to
the ship itself
Life-cycle cost Medium Posit i ve: *
*





Launching techmque can be
expensive
The chaff technique will be
expensive if many "false alarms"
and long transition distance for
the ship
Reliabi lity Medium Posit ive: * Well established techmque
Negative: *
*
Chaff fibers can bundle together
Chaff is sensitive to wind in
combination with the ship heading
Supportabi Lity Medium Negative: * Neea a special organization
aboard for reloading the
Launchers, etc.
Transportabi lity Low Negative: * The amount of chaff grenades that
are needed together with
Launching equipment that must be
mounted and aligned in different
pattern, etc., makes the
transportability low.
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Operational effectiveness Medium Positive: * Can in some cases use combined
ECM techniques
Negative: * Usually power limitations
* Usually warning time necessary
Risk Low Positive: * Usually decoy deployed far from
vital parts of the ship
Life-cycle cost Medium
to high
Evaluation depends on the technique chosen
Reliabi lity Medium Negative: * Decoys can be (very) sensitive to
weather and sea condition
Supportabi lity Medium Evaluation depends on the technique chosen
Transportabi lity Medium Evaluation depends on the technique chosen




Operational effectiveness Medium Positive: * No warning time necessary
Negative: * Limited bandwidth
Risk Medium Negative: * Even if the absorbing efficiency
is high, the large ship size can,







Alternative D is also divided into different kinds of
decoys. They are:







The decision process continues further (Tables 11, 12,
13, 14, 15) with the same criteria definitions areas
previously outlined.




Operational effectiveness High Positive: *
*
Easy for the seeker to change to
new "hot spot" on the ship
No power limitations
Risk High Negative: * The missile is deliberately
guiaed to the ship (close to the
crew and other vital parts)
Life-cycle cost Low
Reliabi lity High
Supportabi lity High Positive: * The system can be made autonomous
Transportabi lity High Negative: * Needs certain preparations aboard
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No warning time necessary
Easy to use combined ECM support
No power limitations
Craft is operable until destroyed
by missile impact
Negative: * Easy to make tactical adaption by
the hostile force
Risk Low Decoy is sepa ratsd from ship
Life-cycle cost Low
Reliabi lity Low
Supportabi lity Medium Negative: *
*
Ueather and sea sensitive
Maneuverability problem
Transportabi lity High Need personne I for launching, etc.




Positive: * Easy to use tacticallyOperational effectiveness Medium
Negative: * Too small for combined ECM
* Power limited
* warning time necessary
Risk Low to Dependent on warning time
Medium
Life-cycle cost Medium Buoys expandable
Reliabi lity Medium Can be sea-state sensitive
Supportabi lity High Can be made autonomous
Transportabi lity High
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Operational effectiveness Medium Positive: *
Negative: *
*
Easy to use tactically








Dependent on warning time
Life-cycle cost Medium Decoy expendable
Reliabi lity Medium Uind sensitive
Supportabi lity High Can be made autonomous
Transportabi lity High




Operational effectiveness Medium Negative: * Needs wa-ning time
* Limited pay-load and power
Risk Low to
Medium
Life-cycle cost Very High RPV is a sophisticated decoy
Reliabi lity Medium Weather dependent
Supportabi lity Low Needs specially-trained personnel for both
launching, maintenance and operation
Transportabi lity Medium
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The towed craft and the buoy alternatives are the two
most interesting of the options. The buoy and the rocket
alternative are very similar to each other, but the buoy
alternative is preferable in this application (due to the
wind problem) . The towed craft has both high efficiency and
low risk. The problem is that it is not a very practical
alternative since it must be towed behind a ship. This also
allows the enemy to easily adapt to the countermeasure. The
buoy alternative is comparable to the towed craft but has
poorer performance since its power is limited. It is also
dependent on a defined reaction time, since the buoys need
to have been just launched from the ship. This problem can
be alleviated with a proper warning and launching equipment.
Both alternatives are currently being developed by companies
around the world. [Ref. 23]
The buoy alternative is chosen, mainly because it is more
practical and flexible for a merchant ship's particular
needs
.
The decoy buoy can be equipped with one of the following:
* noise jammer
* repeater (beacon)





The repeater best meets the requirements above. The noise
jammer needs very high power to be efficient in an
omni-directional jammer technique.
The conclusion is that expendable buoys with a repeater
jammer technique is the ECM choice for the reference ship.
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The buoys should be launched autonomously in predetermined
directions. The warning must be early enough to give the
activated buoys time to be effective against the missile.
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V. ECM RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the discussion above, the most appropriate ECM
support for the reference tanker is the expendable,
omni-directional, repeater jammer buoy.
This chapter will expand the buoy alternative further and
discuss the kind of support requirements needed. The chapter
will not include buoy patterns and other tactical
considerations
.
The general requirements for an operable buoy ECM system
are as follows
:
* the system must be easily installed and removed
* the system must be nearly autonomous, or if not, very
user friendly
* the buoys must be launched to at least a few hundred
meters from the ship in any direction.
* the buoys must be activated within 30 sec (10 km)
from the first detection of the missile and stay
active for at least two minutes.
The following topics will be covered in the chapter:
* repeater jammer operational characteristics
* general buoy description
* ESM support
A. REPEATER JAMMER
The objective of the repeater jammer is to create a
credible false target close to the ship in order to deceive
the missile seeker. Given the specifications discussed
earlier, a repeater jammer can be made small (dimensions)
and light (weight) as mentioned in Chapter 3.
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To create a credible false target, the jammer must repeat
an incoming signal that corresponds to 100,000 sm RCS area.
The following calculations will determine the necessary
system gain and power requirements.
For unity J/S ratio, the required system gain is given by
[Ref . 23]
:
G = 1.4 * 10 4 * A (F) 2
where A is the target cross section in square meters and F
is the operating frequency in Megahertz.
This gives for A = 100,000 sm and F = 10 GHz a required
gain of approximately 90 dB
.
For unity J/S ratio and an omni-directional jamming
antenna the required "electronic" power output is given by
[Ref. 23]






where Pt = output power in watts (radar)
G.^ = antenna power gain (radar)
This gives (P t = 30 KW, = 100,000 sm and Gt = 27 dB
in the mainlobe) the ranges shown in Table 16.
This shows that the earlier the jammer buoys are launched
and activated, the less power is required to simulate a
false target with 100,000 sm RCS area. On the other hand, in
order to deny the missile the ability to change target from
the buoy to the ship during its approach, the jammer must
keep the high RCS return to a very close distance, which
implies the need for the very high output peak power
requirements calculated above. This will also assure that
the missile target seeker will initially "lock on" the buoy.
75
TABLE 16: RANGE AND POWER REQUIREMENTS FOR JAMMER BUOY
E= P= (peak power)
300 m 1.3 MW
1 km 119 KW
5 km 4.8 KW
15 km 530 W
25 km 190 W
30 km 130 W
The power requirements are an important parameter in the
design since the jammer must have power supplied by
batteries. One way of decreasing the high output power
requirements is to launch the buoys toward the approaching
missile. However, if the buoys are launched too far from the
ship, the missile can start a new reacquisition cycle after
passing the buoys, and still hit the ship. Hence, the
optimum buoy pattern must focus on first, trying to keep the
ship in the missile seeker's sidelobes in order to decrease
the power requirements and second, denying the missile a
reacquisition target. A complement to lowering the power
requirements is to decrease the RCS (skin return) of the
ship. There are several approaches to accomplishing this,
including metal nets and RAM.
The antenna is assumed to be omni-directional because of
the buoy size and cost considerations. If only one antenna
is being used (which is advisable on a small buoy) it has to
work both as a receiving and a transmitting antenna. This
implies time gating in the jammer design. Further, some kind
of modulation of the output signal can also be introduced in
the repeater in order to better simulate a "real" target
(echo fluctuation, etc.).[Ref. 23]



















Figure 24. Example of a repeater jammer design
To get the high gain, several TWTs (Travelling Wave
Tubes) cascaded together are required. The TWT bandwidth
should be adjusted to the frequency band of interest in
order to prevent saturation of the jammer.
The duty cycle of the missile seeker radar can be
relatively low. This fact, together with a short operating
time (2 minutes), makes the required energy storage quite
reasonable. This implies that batteries (sea-water activated
and/or lithium) are possible to use.
B. GENERAL BUOY DESCRIPTION
The purpose of this section is to give an example of
how the general features of the buoy can be designed. In the
introduction to Chapter 5 some of the operational buoy
requirements are listed. To fulfill these requirements the
buoy must be launched from the ship in some way. This
implies that the size, shape and weight, etc., of the buoy
must be designed accordingly. In Chapter 3 the repeater
jammer is described as being the size of a sonobuoy (5
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inches in diameter, 30 inches long). Why not use the
well-developed and thoroughly-tested sonobuoy concept and
adapt that idea here? This leads to the following general
buoy philosophy:
The buoy(s) should be delivered folded aboard the ship in
some kind of container, ready to be launched. The containers
should be mounted on the ship deck in such a way as to cover
a number of launching bearings from the ship.
When the buoy is launched from the ship and hits the
water surface, it should unfold itself and begin jamming
immediately. After the active phase (i.e., when the
batteries are out of energy) the buoy should lose its
buoyancy and sink to the sea bottom.
The deployed unfolded buoy is depicted in Figure 25.
[Ref. 26]
Taking advantage of proven techniques keeps the
life-cycle cost of the system down. Also, many other
requirements, such as the supportability and
transportability questions, etc., would already be
satisfied.
There are two launching technique options: 1. using a
rocket to deliver the buoy in position, or 2. using some
kind of catapult. There are advantages and disadvantages
with both of these techniques. The rocket can deliver the
buoy faster and to a greater distance from the ship than the
catapult. On the other hand, the catapult technique gives
lower acceleration stress and is much safer to handle.




In order to launch the buoy in time to be effective,
sufficient warning of an incoming missile is needed. This
can be accomplished in from one to three ways: optically,









Figure 25. Example of an unfolded ECM buoy
method, considering the personnel constraints aboard a
merchant ship. But given an ARM threat, it might be an
advisable tactic to stop ship radar transmission.
The different kinds of signals associated with a missile
launch are
:
* prelaunch targeting radar
* signals for fuze ignition
* altimeter signals
* terminal phase guidance signals
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To receive as much warning time as possible, the most
viable alternative appears to be detecting the signals
radiated from the missile in its terminal phase and signals
from prelaunch targeting radar. The detection of the signals
radiated from the missile in its terminal phase is estimated
to be the most important and least ambiguous.









Real time operation. The threat missile must be
intercepted, detected and classified as soon as it
starts radiating.
Omni-directional coverage. The assumption is that
while there may be a preferred direction of attack,
the system must be designed for attacks originating
from any direction.
Easy to operate. The system would be operated by
non-military people who probably would not spend mucn
resources on training to use the system. As such, the
system must be easy to operate with minimal training.
This translates into a requirement for a high degree
of automation.
* Relatively inexpensive system.
The main objective for the receiver is to intercept and
determine the lethality of incoming signals as quickly as
possible
.
Since the threat in this case is something quite
specific, one design approach for making the system response
faster would be to filter out unwanted signals as early as
possible, in order to keep low the amount of data that needs
to be processed.
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The mode of operation would be to let the system receive
signals from the environment and search for the specific
missile threats that the operator deems to be significant
for the particular war zone through which the ship is
transiting. After having detected and classified the threat
missile, it would alert the operator and pass threat
information to some kind of ECM processor that computes
launching data for the buoys and also issues maneuvering
recommendations to the bridge operator to increase the
probability of countering the threat successfully.
1. Signal environment
The assumption is that the emitters in the
environment, in the frequency band of interest, are from
civilian or military ships and coastal radars. A pulse
density of about 90,000 pulses per second is estimated from
assumptions about the maximum PRF arising from unambiguous
range requirements. (See Appendix H)
The merchant ship itself will have its own
transmitters that may, because of the short distances
involved, get into the ESM system. These signals have to be
screened out to prevent false alarms.
2. ESM receiver
The receiver in this ESM system must be some kind of
Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). An RWR is characterized as a
simple, rugged and relatively inexpensive receiver. A simple
RWR system block diagram is shown in Figure 26 [Ref . 6]
.
There can be a number of integrated antennas and
receivers to cover all azimuth angels and frequency bands.
The performance of an RWR is usually discussed in
terms of sensitivity, dynamic range, probability of
intercept (POI) and throughput rate.
Short definitions of the different terms are given
below. [Ref. 27]
The sensitivity of a receiver is a function of the





Antenna to Receiver Analysis• ^
Figure 26. Simple RWR block diagram
The dynamic range is used to indicate the input signal
amplitude range that the receiver can process properly. The
lower limit of the dynamic range is the sensitivity of the
receiver
.
The POI is used to tell the percentage of pulses the
receiver will collect in a certain signal environment.
The throughput rate is applicable when the signals are
pulsed and tells the maximum pulse rate the receiver can
process
.
One important missile seeker parameter to be
determined by the RWR is the antenna scan pattern. The fact
that the missile seeker is scanning in a sector, which means
that the dwell time on the target is relatively long, makes
this parameter very significant.
Other significant parameters are Angle Of Arrival
(AOA), Pulse Repetition Interval (PRI), Pulse Width (PW),
Freguency and Signal Amplitude.
The following discussion about the reguired
performance parameters for the receiver can be made:
* The receiver sensitivity need not be extremely high
since the seeker radar is guite powerful and the
distances considered are relatively short (5 - 30
km) .
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* The receiver must have wide dynamic range to be able
to handle both strong and weak signals.
* The probability of intercept must be as high as
possible.
The different kinds of RWR receivers (state of the
art) that can be considered are:
* the crystal video receiver
the instantaneous frequency receiver (IFM)
the superheterodyne receiver
the wideband YIG-tuned superheterodyne receiver
The most important features of the techniques are
summarized below.
RWR often use a crystal video receiver, which means
that the mixer, local oscillator (LO) and the IF amplifier
are missing. A block diagram of the receiver is shown in
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Figure 27 . The crystal
video receiver
The receiver is relatively simple, low in cost,
lightweight and small in size. It is used for wideband
detection (2 - 18 GHz) of low duty cycle signals but can
also be modified for CW detection.
The disadvantage with the receiver is that it cannot
closely determine the frequency of the incoming signal.
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Another disadvantage is that the key threat signals can be
masked by other signals and noise jamming.
The sensitivity of the receiver is relatively low,
between -50 dBm and -60 dBm. It has a high probability of
intercept and a large dynamic range.
The IFM receiver is essentially a crystal video
receiver but is provided with a delay line which makes it
possible to measure freguency. The RF bandwidth is wide,
sometimes up to more than one octave. The weakest point in
the IFM receiver is that it can be captured by a strong CW
or jamming signal. There are ways of getting around this
problem, [Ref . 27] by using a frequency rejection technique
for the offending emitter. The POI can be made to approach
100%. The dynamic range and the sensitivity are moderately
high.
Modern IFM receivers are mostly digitized (DIFM),
which gives the ability to detect intrapulse frequency agile
emitters. Some typical DIFM values for X-band interception
are a sensitivity of -65 dBm and a dynamic range of 70 dB
.
A typical block diagram of an IFM receiver is shown in












Figure 28. The IFM receiver
A superheterodyne receiver has a very high
sensitivity, excellent selectivity and frequency resolution.
Superheterodyne receivers use a mixer, LO and filter to get
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an IF frequency which can then be processed further. To get
the receiver to intercept more than one frequency signal,
the receiver must scan a frequency band. The YIG technique
is used most frequently, but it gives a relatively narrow
bandwidth. A scanning receiver gives a poor POI and also has
a problem intercepting emitters with scanning antennas. The
superheterodyne receiver is used primarily in SIGINT or to
complement another faster receiver, in order to get the fine
grain information.












A special case of the YIG tuned narrowband
superheterodyne receiver is the "wideband superheterodyne
receiver." This gives very good detection of wideband radars
such as frequency agile and pulse compression radars. It can
also be designed with switchable filters that can be tuned
to frequency bands of interest. As a result the scanning
procedure can now be made very fast (in the order of
microseconds )
.
A block diagram of the wideband superheterodyne
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Figure 30. The wideband
superheterodyne receiver
As indicated above, the most common receiver in RWR
applications is the Crystal Video Receiver. However, it must
be complemented with another receiver (i.e., a
superheterodyne receiver) to measure frequency, and this
takes time. Further, the wide bandwidth capacity is not a
requirement for the receiver in this application. It is,
rather, a disadvantage since only very specific signals in a
limited frequency band need to be detected.
Another alternative might be to consider a wideband
superheterodyne receiver. The receiver would be stepped to a
particular frequency band of interest where it then sweeps
through this band continuously. It would consequently spend
less time scanning, resulting in a higher POI
.
In this way unwanted frequencies will be filtered out,
since they are outside the band of immediate interest, and
the downstream processing need not cope with these signals,
which will speed up the processing rate. The penalty of
using some kind of scanning receiver is always that the POI
goes down, even though the frequency band is limited and the
scanning rate very high.
To fulfill the requirements of AOA, a number of
matched receivers can be arranged in a certain configuration
(i.e., four receivers, one in each quadrant). The




In order to get high throughput rate, further
filtering can be applied before the actual pulse parameter
measurements in the preprocessor. The main processor could
be in parallel with auxiliary processors. To process the
signals in real time, window addressable memory (WAM) can be
used to assist in the pulse deinterleaving and pulse train
matching. The display console should also be "smart" in
order to offload the main processor. E.g, keyboard scanning




In order to be an autonomous system the user interface
must be provided with an automatic mode. When the processor
finds a lethal match, i.e., an incoming missile, launch data
should go directly to the buoy system and to the maneuvering
display, via some kind of "ECM processor." The ECM processor
should calculate the necessary launching and maneuvering
data, due to the ship's RCS variations, maneuvering data and
wind conditions , etc.
Even though the system can be put in an automatic
mode, an operator must be able to manually operate the
system and provide it with necessary initial values. The
user interface can consist of a pictorial display, a numeric
keypad and some hard and soft keys. The soft function keys
can have descriptions written on the display and a menu
selection method can be used for prompting and obtaining
operator commands. The pictorial display must show the
threats (with azimuth and estimated range) and the
maneuvering recommendation.
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VI. ACOUSTIC ENVIRONMENT STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will give a general description of the
Baltic Ocean characteristics and will provide specific
detail of the water volume of interest in the sonar design.
B. THE BALTIC OCEAN
The Baltic Ocean is a sub-sea to the Atlantic Ocean and
is delimited by the Scandinavian peninsula and the Danish
Islands (see Appendix I). The area is 366,000 knr and the
average depth is 65 m. [Ref . ,28] The Baltic is in some sense
an inland sea, since it has very narrow and shallow
connections to the North Sea and the Atlantic in the west.
The water balance can be described with Figure 31 below. The
large amount of water from the many rivers makes the Baltic
a brackish sea, and the salinity can vary considerably
depending on geographical location and depth (Figure 31).
Figure 31 shows that the Baltic works more or less like a
gigantic mouth of a river [Ref. 29].
The sea-bottom conditions vary both in roughness and
consistency, depending on the geographical location. The sea
bottom in the specified water volume will be described later
in this chapter.
The density of water depends on salinity, pressure and
temperature. Low density water is lighter and is layered on
top of high density water. Fresh water supplies from the
rivers, wind and temperature variations help to destroy or
maintain established water layers. How the salinity in the
Baltic varies is shown in Figure 32 [Ref. 29].
88





d) 450 ! »
a) 450
Kattegatt
a ) from rivers
b) from rain
c) evaporation
d-e) water exchange Baltic Sea - Kattegatt
Figure 31. Water balance in the Baltic Sea




Salinity in the middle of the Baltic is 6.5 - 7.5 PPT,
in a layer from the surface down to 60 - 80 meters depth. In
deep water regions, salinity increases to 10 - 12 PPT.
2. Currents
The sea currents are created and maintained by the
following forces:
* wind
horizontal water density differences
slope of the sea surface
tide
air pressure differences
The wind influences mainly the water closest to the
sea surface and the effect decreases rapidly with depth.
Water volumes can have different densities which creates
pressure differences and hence, currents. If the water
surface is slanted, this also causes pressure differences.
Tide always implies currents, but since the tide in the
Baltic is negligible, the contribution is small. The air
pressure forces the sea surface level to go higher and lower
which also creates currents. The velocities of the deep sea
currents are shown in Figure 33 [Ref. 29].
Depth Wind (m/s )
(m) 1 5 10 20 30
0,1 0,2 0.5 1,0 1,5
1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,5
5 0,0 0,1 0,1 0.2 0,3
10 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2
15 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,2
Figure 33. The velocity of the deep sea
currents in the Baltic Sea
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3 . Wind and Waves
The wind direction is in general to west or south-west
the whole year around (open sea). The average wind velocity
can be estimated to be approximately 8-10 m/s. In order to
determine the wave height, the diagram in Appendix J can be
used, with the wind velocity as the input value. Average
wave heights at the Almagrundets lighthouse and two other
locations are given in Table 17 according to the month of
the year
.
































The average wave height for the whole year is then 0.8
meters. The wind and waves causes the water surface layer to
be stirred down to approximately 10 meters, depending on the
time of year and the weather conditions. This creates a
layer of air bubbles under the sea surface that will highly
affect the surface reverberation level.
4. Speed of sound
The speed of sound is mainly influenced by the water
temperature in the Baltic. The salinity has almost no effect
at all. It is therefore sufficient to determine the speed of
sound profile by simply measuring the water temperature as a
function of depth. The temperature differences are largest
from the surface down to around 40 meters. Below 40 meters
the temperature is almost constant. At these depths the
higher salinity (10 - 12 PPT) cause the speed of sound to
increase slightly. During the summer the surface water is
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warm and the underlying water cold. This implies a sharp
negative gradient and the sound is strongly refracted toward
the bottom. Together with the slightly positive gradient at
deeper depths this creates a sound channel, very much like
the SOFAR channel in the deep oceans. During the winter the
surface water gets colder than the underlying water which
makes the gradient iso-speed or positive. A positive
gradient makes the sound bend toward the surface. Further,
it is quite normal to have iso-speed water from the surface
and down to 1 - 10 meters due to the stirring effect.
An assumption is that the speed of sound profile is
range independent out to a radius of approximately 1,000
meters. [Ref. 30]
5. Absorption
The absorption of sound in water increases with
frequency and decreases with salinity. The diagram in
Appendix K shows the absorption in dB/km vice frequency, for
both the Baltic and the Atlantic ocean. For example, in the
Baltic the absorption is 9 dB/km at 100 KHz compared with 30
dB/Km in the Atlantic Ocean. This means that higher
frequencies are more favorable in the Baltic, which also
implies that smaller and lighter transducer dimensions may
be used.
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE WATER VOLUME
The location of the water volume, that will be the
reference for the sonar design calculations, is shown in
Appendix L. The speed of sound profiles for different
months, together with ray tracing results are shown in
Appendix M. The typical sea bottom condition is shown in
Figure 34 [Ref. 31]
.
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water v=1440 m/s c=1.0 kg/nr
clay (silt) v=1500 m/s c=1.3 kg/m3 slOra
Figure 34. The reference sea bottom
D. AMBIENT NOISE STUDY
The ambient noise is the noise existing in the
environment in the absence of both the sonar platform and
the target [Ref. 7] . The objective in this section of the
chapter is to determine the Noise Spectrum Level (NSL(A) ) in
dB re l ^ Pa/Hz 1//2 for the reference water volume described
above
.
The ocean is never quiet. The lower limit for the noise
is the thermodynamic noise, which is created by the
molecular movements in the water. In addition to this, sea
waves, surf, animals in the sea and ship traffic make
contributions depending on the geographical location and the
sea state. The only contribution to the NSL in this case,
besides the thermodynamic noise, is the noise from waves
[Ref. 30] . The NSL(A) values for the sonar design can
therefore be taken from Knudsen curves shown in Appendix N.
The NSL falls off toward higher frequencies with 5 - 6 dB
per octave, until approximately 100 kHz. Then the




VII. SONAR DESIGN STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
This introduction will determine the sonar
specification and give a more detailed picture of the design
objective. It will also explain the design method that will
be used in pursuing the objective.
As indicated in Chapter 1, the main goal of using a sonar
system is to give the ship sufficient time to detect,
classify and avoid a proximity mine in its path. In order to
write the sonar specification the following questions must
first be answered:
1. Which ship maneuver is effective in avoiding mines?
2. At what range and angles must the mine be detected and
classified to ensure effective ship maneuver?
3. What are acceptable probabilities for detection and
false alarm in the detection process?
In answering the first question, there are two kinds of
maneuver options: crash stop or a sharp turn. When using a
crash stop the ship will stop at an ahead distance of
3,000 m and slide 300 m in side (Appendix C) . when using a
sharp turn instead, the ship will make a 90 degree turn at
an ahead distance of 850 m and slide 650 m in side. The
difference between the two maneuvers, besides the distances,
is that the sliding effect in the latter case is more
controlled by the ship operator. If the maneuvers could be
done without the sliding effect, this would be a great
advantage. This is because there is usually not just one
single mine ahead, but instead some kind of a mine field.
Since a deployed mine field pattern by an enemy is usually
unknown, the sliding effect in both maneuvers can cause the
ship to activate additional mines while doing the avoiding
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maneuver. Accordingly, the best maneuver is to make a crash
stop with no sliding and with a short stop distance and then
back out in the ship's own wake. Since this is not an option
in this case, due to the maneuvering data in Appendices C
and E, the second best alternative is to perform a
controlled maneuver with as little sliding and ahead
distance as possible. So, the answer to the first question
is to use a sharp turn maneuver.
Question 2 is answered with Figure 35 below.
In order to pass the mine at a safe distance (in this
case 30 meters), the mine must be detected at an ahead
distance of 700 meters. This distance is determined from the
turning test data in Appendix E and includes an estimated
decision time for the ship operator of 30 seconds (or 240
meters at 16 knots) before the maneuver is ordered. If this
time can be made very short, say 5 seconds (or 40 meters
with 16 knots), the required detection distance decreases to
500 meters. This is the absolute minimum distance for an
avoiding maneuver to be successful. During the avoiding
maneuver, the sonar must search a forward sector of at least
+10 degrees in order to indicate an approaching mine threat
at 700 meters and to keep track of a detected mine down to
500 meters
.
An answer to question 3 determines under what conditions
the mine must be detected. The determination of the two
probabilities is a matter of the cost of making an incorrect
decision. To set the values of the probabilities is a very
difficult task. They vary with tactics, strategy and
environmental factors. In most cases a combination of
experience, intuition and sonar tests have to be used to
determine them. [Ref. 9] The probabilities are used in the
sonar design to determine a threshold value in the detection
process. A typical value for the probability of detection
P(D) is 50%, when consulting the literature. Also, some
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Proximity dist 20 m
Safe dist 30 ra
700 ra







Figure 35. Determining the minimum detection range and
search sector
books actually define the detection threshold with the P(D)
set to 50%. [Ref. 32] The probability of false alarm P(FA)
is defined as the probability of getting a false alarm in
the same interval of time as the signal duration. [Ref. 9]
It is already now quite obvious that a very narrow sonar
beamwidth will be necessary in order to minimize the
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reverberation element. This implies that very few false
alarms for each transmitted pulse can be accepted. There are
approximately 1,000 range increments in one beam (Figure
35), using a pulse length of 0.8 ms (to be explained in a
later section on sonar design) and a max distance of 700
meters. Hence, there are 1,000 range intervals examined for
each pulse, and with the assumption that no more than one of
those will be registered as a false detection, gives a P(FA)
of 1/1000 = 10" 3 . [Ref. 7]
The sonar concept comprises, in this case, an active,
high freguency sonar. In most cases an active sonar implies
a reverberation limited performance. This will be the
assumption even in this case. A stationary target, like a
mine, produces no Doppler shift in the returning echo
signal. The echo spectral density and the reverberation
spectral density will therefore be essentially identical in
their form, when intercepted by the receiver. Based on the
discussion above, the sonar specification is stated as
follows
:
The sonar must be able to detect a generic proximity mine
with a P(D) of 50% and a P(FA) of 10" 3 , in a sector of +
10 degrees from the ahead direction, in a range gate
extending from 500 meters out to 700 meters.






* beamwidth and beamform
* sonar depth
Figure 36 shows a block diagram of the design method.
After calculating the indicated parameters in the active

















Figure 36. Sonar design method
Since we want to use as low a power as possible in the
system, the noise floor (ambient noise and self noise) will
decide the reverberation level. The situation is illustrated
in Figure 37 [Ref. 32]. Increasing the power level further
will have no effect on the sonar range. After the necessary
beamwidth is calculated, a discussion about beam forming and






limited performance of a
sonar system
B. SONAR DESIGN: STEP 1
1. Carrier frequency
The choice of carrier frequency is a very important
step, because it involves trade-offs among many interacting
parameters. In general, a long range "surveillance" sonar
implies low frequencies and short range "classification"
sonar implies high frequencies.
The following issues must be discussed before a
frequency choice can be made:
* upper limit wavelength to detect the target
resolution versus transducer size
absorption
ambient noise and power dependence
Starting with the first issue, the wavelength must be
smaller than the target size in order to make a detection
(in a non-resonant case). The smaller the wavelength the
more information about the target can be revealed in the
detection process. Since the target in this case is a mine
with a minimum size of 0.6 meters, it is clear that high
frequencies (above 10 kHz) must be considered.
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The second issue shows the very strong relationship
between resolution and transducer size. This is not always
true though, since modern signal processing technigues can
overcome that relationship to some degree. The general
relationship between the resolution and the transducer size
is that the (3 dB) beamwidth gets smaller when the
transducer size gets larger, for a fixed freguency. This
relationship often limits the smallest design beamwidth,
since the transducer size must be designed according to the
ship size and because the costs increase with large
transducers. Different transducers and beamforming
technigues will be discussed later in this chapter. In order
to make feasibility calculations and comparisons in the
following design steps, a reference transducer will be
determined. The sonar carrier is in this case a VLCC tanker,
with the sonar design constraints given in Chapter 1. The
fact that the sonar is mounted on the bow of the ship and
must be removable, implies that the size and shape must be
designed according to this. Since the transducer is kept
within a streamlined dome and mounted as an extension of the
bow bulb, a circular transducer aperture or array is
preferable. The maximum possible transducer diameter is
taken to be 1 meter, considering practical handling and the
problem of getting a smooth and strong bonding between the
ship hull and sonar dome. The normalized far-field










where a = radius
6 = polar angle in spherical coordinates
J 2 ( • ) = first order Bessel function of the first
kind
From this an approximate expression for the 3 dB
beamwidth can be derived [Ref . 34] :
65 X
BW (in degrees).^
where lambda is the wavelength and d is the transducer
diameter. A simple calculation indicates that to achieve a
beamwidth of less than one degree (conical beam) the carrier
frequency must exceed 100 kHz. Since the target is
relatively small in size, it will be necessary to use very
narrow beams, probably fractions of a degree. This implies
that carrier frequencies of 100 kHz and above must be used.
The third issue counteracts the usage of high
frequencies due to the increasing energy absorption at
higher frequencies. The absorption depends mainly on the
salinity in the water, which gives an advantage of using
high frequencies in the Baltic vice the Atlantic Ocean (see
Chapter 6). However, even in the Baltic the absorption will
be very significant, when using frequencies above 100 kHz,
as can be seen in Table 18.
The fourth issue indicates that the ambient noise and
transmitting power must be considered before determining the
frequency. As can be seen in Appendix 0, the declining
ambient noise with frequency has a break point around 100
kHz and will then increase with frequency. This ambient
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noise is due to molecular movement in the water. In order to
keep the NSL down, frequencies in the lower region, around
100 kHz are preferable. The power limitation works the
opposite way. Higher frequencies allow higher power levels
to be transmitted into the ocean. This is due to cavitation
effects on the sonar surface and will be further treated
later in this chapter.
A target's resonance region for spheres is determined
by the factor ka, where k = 2 ir /X and a is the target
radius. The resonance region is usually in the ka interval
2-30. Hence, if the speed of sound is 1500 m/s the target's
resonance frequency can be found in the interval [Ref. 35]:
1500 22500
f =
t a ir- a
(Hz)
In this case a = 0.6, so the resonance frequencies
must be somewhere between 796 Hz and 12 kHz. A transmitted
signal with a frequency in this interval could trigger the
target's resonances. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this can
enhance the target strength (TS) but it can also lower it,
if the target has high internal losses or if the reradiated
sound is radiated in directions other than the specular
direction. [Ref. 9] In order to utilize the resonance
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phenomena, experiments must be performed to first determine
the resonance frequencies for the particular target and then
measure how the target strength varies. Since in this case
the target can have many different shapes and these shapes
are practically always unknown, the technique has many
disadvantages and can probably not be utilized. Further
research and experiments must be performed to investigate
this
.
To determine an optimum frequency is not an obvious
thing to do. Especially since the assumption is that of
reverberation limited performance, where the frequency
dependent absorption coefficient is essentially the same for
the echo and for the reverberation background [Ref. 6].
There must be a trade-off decision with the parameters above
as input values. One conclusion is that with the detection
range requirement stipulated in the introduction to this
chapter, the frequency range must be within 100 - 500 kHz,
mainly in order to balance transducer size and absorption.
In order to make comparisons and facilitate the final
decision, it is advisable to carry along both limiting
frequencies, 100 and 500 kHz, in the design.
2. Transmission loss (TL)
To detect a target, transmitted energy (soundwave)
from the transducer must find a path to the target and back
to the transducer. Since the speed of sound, with which the
energy is propagating, is a function of salinity, pressure
and the temperature of the propagating medium, different
speeds of sound will occur at different locations. The speed
of sound differences have the effect of refracting the
energy in a direction dependent on the gradient. In this
case the most significant speed of sound differences occur
as a function of water depth. If the required detection
range had been greater than 1,000 meters, the speed of sound
differences in azimuthal distance had also been important.
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The energy propagation or sound field can be described with
rays which obey "Snell's laws" of refraction, and a ray
tracing diagram can be produced for a specific speed of
sound profile. There are a number of limitations in the ray
tracing concept, since both boundaries (surface and bottom)
are assumed to be flat and rigid. Further, no estimation of
energy scattered into shadow zones is indicated. A ray
tracing program [Ref . 36] has been used in Appendix M, to
show the propagating sound field for monthly average speed
of sound profiles and different source depths. After
discussing the sonar concept with different references [Ref.
30, 36] the conclusion is that there must be a direct path
between the transducer and the target, in order to achieve
reliable detection criteria. Ray reflections from the
boundaries can cause multipath effects and disturb the
direct ray echo return. This will be further investigated
later. When examining the ray diagrams in Appendix M, direct
ray paths can be found for all months except June, July and
October, with the source at 10 meters depth. The summer is a
difficult season, due to the very strong negative gradient,
which causes the rays to strongly refract toward the bottom
and create a sharp shadow zone. The shadow zone is not
completely dark, however. Some sound energy exists in the
zone and measurements have been done at 24 kHz that gave TL
values between 20 to 70 dB/Kyd close to the boundary. [Ref.
9] Sound waves propagating in the ocean normally get
delayed, distorted and weakened during their transition.
This is due to the nature of boundary layers, absorption and
the geometrical spreading of the sound field. These
phenomena can be taken together in a transmission loss (TL)
factor, which is defined as the weakening of sound between a
point 1 meter from the source and another point at a
distance in the sea. [Ref. 9]
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Since at this stage only the direct sound path is
considered, and because of the short range requirements,
only absorption and geometrical spreading will influence our
TL factor. In a sound channel the sound is first spread
spherically out to a transition range, which can be
estimated by the following formula, valid for a mixed layer
with a positive speed of sound gradient near the sea surface




t ^ D -
where Z = source depth
D = depth of mixed layer
Beyond this range the spreading will become
cylindrical and if the two boundary layers are accounted
for, something in between spherical and cylindrical will
occur. The TL formulas for the two spreading forms are [Ref.
32] :
Spherical spreading: TL = 20 log r
Cylindrical spreading: TL = 10 log r
Using the formula above and comparing with the speed
of sound profiles in Appendix P, the transition range will
exceed 1,000 meters for all months, and since 700 meters is
less than that, only spherical spreading needs to be used.
Adding the absorption loss to the spherical spreading gives
the following expression [Ref. 32]:
TL = 20 log r + ar (Equation 1)
where a = absorption
r = range
The absorption at different frequencies is found in
Table 18 above and the TL for the two carrier frequencies
and range limits are shown in Table 19.
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TABLE 19. TL FOR CARRIER FREQUENCIES, RANGES
100kHz 500 kHz
TL at 500 m 59 dB 104.0 dB
TL at 700 in 63.9 dB 126.9 dB
An estimation of the geometrical TL factor can also be
performed by using ray diagrams. For two rays with a
separation of Ah meters, the transmission loss expression at
range r is given by:
TL ,= 10» log
where r = range
Ah = vertical ray separation at range r (meters)
AG = initial ray separation (radians)
For example, in January, where two rays are clearly
distinguishable (with Ah = 12 meters, ^8 = 0.0175 radians (1
degree) and r = 700 m)
, TL = 56.82 dB. This should be
compared with a spherical geometrical spreading of 20 * log
700 = 56.9 dB. The comparison verifies the spherical
spreading assumption.
A Swedish defense agency [Ref . 30, 37] has, in its
model for TL (layered medium), adapted spherical spreading
up to a distance of 500 meters. For distances exceeding 500
meters, cylindrical spreading is used together with a
freguency dependent loss that is composed by the absorption
and an additional leakage loss. The expression for TL when
r > 500 meters yields:
TL = 10 log r + (ex + a
x
) r + 27 (Eguation 2)
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where 27 dB is the TL up to 500 m
ex = absorption coefficient
cx-l = leakage coefficient
The leakage coefficient decreases with frequency and
is linear in a logarithmic scale. The expression for the
leakage coefficient (32 Hz - 8 kHz) yields:
«! = 1.88 - 0.42 log f
With the assumption that this relationship holds even for
higher frequencies (100 and 500 kHz), the leakage
coefficient will become zero and Equation 2 will become the
same as the original TL Equation 1 above.
The following conclusions can be made based on the
results above
:
* The source depth must be at approximately 10 meters,
in order to get most direct paths to the target.
* The spherical spreading with absorption (Equation 1)
expression can be used as the TL term in the active
sonar equation.
* "Safe" ship operation will not be possible the entire
year.
3. Resolution, waveform and target detection
The resolution of a sonar system can be defined by
either its measuring precision or its detection capability
and depends on
:
* the pulse length
* the beamwidth
* the target strength (TS)
* the angle of incident upon the target
* the display and recording technique
The pulse length choice has three important
implications. First, it determines the range resolution of
the system. Second, it determines how much of the total
target strength can be utilized. Third, it determines the
reverberation element in length. The pure range resolution
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is of minor importance in this case, since it is very
unlikely that two mines are deployed very closely together.
Of more importance is to minimize the reverberation element
as much as possible. Further, in order to get full usage of
the target strength, the pulse width must fully ensonify the
target [Ref. 10]. For this latter reason the following
expression for pulse width must be used:
4r*2
r =
where A r = resolution in meters
c = speed of sound
A 4r of 0.6 meters and c of 1500 m/s gives a pulse
width of 0.8 ms . The expression for range resolution is
Pulsewidth * C
2
which gives a range resolution of
0.8 ms * 1500 =0.6 meters
This means that if two mines are deployed with less than 0.6
meters between them (which is very unlikely), the echo
return will contain both targets and they cannot be
distinguished. Hence, the combination of utilizing the full
target strength, together with getting minimum reverberation
element in length, yields a pulse duration of 0.8 ms
.
The return pulse will be stretched out in time by
2*L/c seconds, where L is the target range dimension [Ref.
7]. Using L = 0.3 (since spherical or cylindrical mine
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shape) the returning echo will be 1.2 ras long. The fact that
the ship is moving toward the mine, with a speed of 16 knots
(8 m/s), counteracts this pulse stretching. Using Ziomek
[Ref. 33:p. 200], a time-compression^ stretch factor can be




where b = - 0.0053 and c = 0.0053 s is then equal to 1.011.
Comparing this (reciprocal value) with the pulse length 0.8
ms, gives a pulse compression effect of 0.01 ms . The
conclusion is that the time compression, due to the ship
speed, has only a minor impact on the returning pulse. The
returning pulse will consequently be 1.2 ms - 0.01 ms = 1.19
ms long. This determines the receiver bandwidth to be at
least 1/T = 840 Hz.
The angle of incidence upon the target has very little
effect in this case, because the shape of the mine is
spherical or cylindrical. The angle of incidence would be of
more importance, though, if the mine had been deployed on
the bottom.
The last issue above, the display and recording
device, will not be covered in this thesis. It is assumed
that these devices are chosen to present the resolution
necessary to fulfill the sonar objective.
The detection threshold (DT) of a sonar system is
defined as the input minimum signal-to-noise power ratio,
within the bandwidth of the system, that; after all
processing (mental analysis) of the received stimulus
(signal plus noise) is completed; will guarantee a given
probability of detection (P(D)) for a specified probability
of false alarm (P(FA)). [Ref. 7] The detection threshold
expression depends on the detection index, that is the value
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determined from the probabilities P(D) and P(FA); the signal
wave form and the choice of detection technique. There are
two different detection techniques that will be discussed
later. The first is a coherent detection, where the signal
is exactly known; and the second is an incoherent detection
where the signal is unknown. A coherent receiver is a
crosscorrelator, where the signal plus noise is correlated
with a noise free replica of the known signal. The
crosscorrelator is optimal for a background of Gaussian
noise. The incoherent receiver is an energy detector that
considers only the amplitude modulation of the signal. Two
different transmitting wave forms will also be discussed;
the continuous wave (CW) pulse and the linear frequency
modulated pulse (LFM). The CW pulse is just a sinosoid that
is turned on and off and is therefore very simple and
inexpensive to implement. The LFM pulse is a more
complicated waveform that needs to be explained a little
further. LFM means that the transmitting signal frequency
varies linearly during the pulse length. A pulse modulated
like this is normally much more effective against a target
having no or very little Doppler effect. The advantage of
utilizing LFM pulse instead of CW pulse is described in
Figure 38 [Ref . 37] . A short CW pulse has a large bandwidth
and the reverberation is spread out over that same
bandwidth. A stationary target is then located entirely in
the reverberation. A long CW pulse has a small bandwidth but
a wider range gate. In this case very little Doppler is
needed to lift the target out of the reverberation. The echo
from a LFM pulse is stretched out both in time and in
frequency and only a part of the reverberation is added to
the target echo. The signal processing then makes the
reverberation part of the pulse very short.
Figure 39 shows the difference between a CW pulse and








Figure 38. The LFM waveform advantage
Figure 39. Difference between an LFM pulse and a CW pulse on
a FPI,
A variation of the pulsed LFM modulation is the
Continuous Transmission Frequency Modulation (CTFM). The
frequency modulated signal is continuously transmitted and
the different frequencies of the outgoing and incoming
signal are determined. This frequency difference is a
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measure of the target distance. CTFM sonar gives very good
audio information of the echo structure of the target, which
can be used for detection and classification [Ref. 37]. The
major disadvantage with a CTFM sonar is that two apertures
or arrays must be used and there must be good isolation
between the two. Due to the practical disadvantages with
such a system and the increasing costs, this modulation type
»
will be of minor interest.
The DT expressions for different detection techniques
and wave forms will now be discussed. DT expressions from
three different references will be covered, since there are
differences between them. The pulse duration will be the
same for both pulse forms in the calculations in order to
obtain a comparison. The design criteria for swept bandwidth






= phase deviation constant (rad/sec^)
T = pulse length
With a return pulse length of 0.8 ms and the
inequality set to one, the swept bandwidth must be 5 kHz. By
setting the inequality to 1, the range resolution will
decrease to 0.3 meters, when not considering the pulse
stretching discussed above. Since the carrier frequencies
are up in the 100/500 kHz range, a swept bandwidth of 5 kHz
still makes the signal to be "narrowband." In all the
calculations below, a return signal pulse length of 1.2 ms
will be used. For detection index and the "delta"
calculations, the curves in Appendix P will be used.
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a. Incoherent detection
Urick assumes in his book [Ref. 9] that the
reverberation is "noise like" and describes a "rule of
thumb" expression for the DT as follows:
DT = 5- log
d-w
- 10 log w' + A (1)
where d = detectivity index (from ROC curves in Appendix P)
w = receiver bandwidth
w' = reverberation bandwidth
T = pulse length
= compensation factor for small bandwidth products
(Appendix P) .
Urick refers to a paper by Kroenert [Ref. 38] for
information about different DT expressions. Kroenert 's
expressions are based on Urick' s assumptions and yield:
DT(CW) = 10 * log (T *,[d ) + - 10 * log T
DT(LFM) = 5 * log (d * T/w' ) + - 10 * log T
(2)
(3)
The third reference is from Burdick's book [Ref. 7]
and he assumes that the target signal and the reverberation
have the same spectral shape and no processing advantages,
with different filter technigues, can be gained. The DT
expression, derived in this book, is directly related to
this application, with a stationary target and reverberation
limited performance. The DT is then a function depending
only on the detection index.
DT = 5 * log d (4)
where d is obtained from the ROC curves for a unity time
bandwidth product (d = 75) .
The numerical values for the above expressions are:
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Using Equation 1 with:
d=detectivity index (from ROC curves Appendix P)=ll
w = receiver bandwidth = 833 Hz
w'=reverberation bandwidth=5 kHz with LFM, 833 with CW
T = pulse length = 1.2 ms
A= (from Appendix P) 1.5 for LFM and 3 for CW yields:
DT(CW-pulse) = 8.3 dB
DT(LFM-pulse) = -
. 6 dB
Using Equations 2 and 3 with the same values as above
yields
:
DT(CW-pulse) = 8.2 dB
DT(LFM-pulse) = 3.3 dB
Using Equation 4 with d = 75 yields:
DT(CW-pulse) = 9 dB
b. Coherent detection:
Only Kroenert's paper gives expressions for DT with a
coherent receiver.
DT(CW-pulse) = 10 * log (d * T/2) - 10 * log T
DT(LFM-pulse) = 10 * log (d/ (2 *w' ) ) - 10 * log T
Using the same values as above yields:
DT(CW-pulse) = 7.4 dB
DT(LFM-pulse) = -0.4 dB
In conclusion, since a coherent detection technique is
optimized for Gaussian noise (which is not the case here), an
incoherent detection technique must be the most appropriate in
this design. Later in the chapter it will also be concluded that
the impact of multipath interference supports a choice of an
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incoherent receiver technique, especially in an active sonar
application. Using an incoherent detection technique gives a
number of DT choices as shown above. An LFM waveform gives
the lowest DT in all cases, as expected. The problem with
using LFM is that it is a much more sophisticated technique,
which implies higher costs both for purchase of the sonar
and for maintenance. These are not desirable factors when
considering the main objective of the design. This implies,
that if the detection goal can be fulfilled with a CW pulse,
this must be a preferable waveform. Therefore, a CW pulse is
chosen to be the main alternative, and a "worst case" DT of
+ 9 dB is adopted for the further design.
The returning carrier frequency will be shifted up
in frequency due to the ship's speed (Doppler effect). The
returning pulse length will also be stretched from 0.8 ms to
1.19 ms . This makes the necessary receiver bandpass filter
decrease from 1250 Hz to 840 Hz. The bandpass filter must be
centered due to the Doppler shifted carrier frequency, that
is at 101.1 kHz for a 100 kHz transmitted frequency and at
505.3 kHz for a 500 kHz transmitted frequency. In order to
make the receiver susceptible to changeable ship speeds, a
parallel filter solution can be considered. This will
increase the cost, though.
C. SONAR CONCEPT
The main objective of the sonar is to detect a target,
i.e., a mine. A refinement of this objective is to include a
classification of the detected target. This would
discriminate against "false targets" and avoid unnecessary
ship maneuvers. This part of the chapter will investigate
whether it is possible to design such a sonar for this
application or not. It will be shown that only a




A classification sonar must comprise a very high
resolution and give a TV-like picture of the target.
Classification sonars are mostly designed as side-looking
sonar, where a towed linear array can be utilized. This
facilitates the sonar design, since different kinds of
synthetic aperture array techniques can easily be
implemented.
The requirement for a classification sonar is to obtain a
resolution element on the order of 1/10 of the object size,
for a reliable classification. [Ref . 39] This means that a
mine, with a minimum diameter of 0.6 meters, must have a
resolution element of 0.06 meters. Taking this value and
evaluating the horizontal beamwidths for the ranges 500 and
700 meters gives:
At 500 meters -- 0.0014 degrees
At 700 meters -- 0.00098 degrees
Using these required beamwidths as a reference, some
design concepts will now be discussed.
1. Case 1: Using ordinary beamforming with a circular
piston
The approximate formula was given on page 100 for a
circular piston.
The aperture diameter necessary to achieve the
required beamwidths above are shown in Table 20.
It can be clearly stated that this technique is
impossible to pursue.
TABLE 20. APERTURE DIAMETERS
100 kHz 500 kHz
at 500 meters 4,062 meters 812 meters
at 700 meters 5,687 meters 1,138 meters
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2. Case 2: Using beam focusing
The idea is depicted in Figure 40 [Ref. 34]. The
target is located in the transducer's nearfield and is
focused at a particular distance, using complex phase
weights or by simply using a curved aperture. The resolution
at the focal point then depends on the diameter of the Airy




where Lm j_ n = limit of resolution
f = focal length
X = wavelength
D = aperture diameter
2







Figure 40. The near-field characteristics of an
unfocused beam (top) and a steerable focused beam
(bottom)
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In order to focus the aperture, the target must be in





where R is the radius in this case.
Calculating the aperture radius for these values
yields the figures in Table 21.
TABLE 21. APERTURE RADIUS
100 kHz 500 kHz
at 500 meters 1 . 55 meters . 7 meters
at 700 meters 1 . 83 meters . 82 meters
To achieve the required resolution due to the Airy-
disc yields the aperture radius in Table 22.
TABLE 22. APERTURE RADIUS
100 kHz 500 kHz
at 500 meters 76 meters 15 meters
at 700 meters 106 meters 21 meters
Even if it is possible to achieve a near field
solution, the impact of the Airy function makes the
technique impossible to pursue.
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To achieve high resolution, in this application, is
not an obvious and easy task. Even with different kinds of
traditional array shading techniques, beamwidths like 0.0014
degrees are impossible to get. Maybe new signal processing
techniques, like the frequency domain adaptive beamforming
technique can narrow down the beamwidth to what is required.
The conclusion is that the design must be restricted to a
traditional classification sonar, and the necessary
beamwidth will be decided using the reverberation limited
active sonar equation.
D. MULTIPATH PROPAGATION STUDY
Multipath propagation originates with a single sonar
induced by pulses whose reflected paths arrive at the
receiver at different times due to sound bending in the
water and reflections from the sea surface and the sea
bottom. Multipath propagation occurs primarily with ducted
propagation and in shallow water. The major multipath
propagation effects are:
* signal fluctuations in amplitude and phase
* signal distortion
* signal decorrelation in amplitude and phase
* frequency broadening
The signal fluctuation can cause fading effects, which
means that the target detectability decreases. Signal
distortion degrades coherent detection. Decorrelation
adversely effects the beam forming properties of
multi-element arrays. Finally, frequency broadening implies
that a wider receiver bandwidth must be used, which
increases the noise and reverberation in the detection
process. Therefore, multipath propagation is a very unwanted
phenomena. It will be shown that multipath is not a major
problem for this design due to the short wavelength and
rough boundaries . [Ref. 9, 41]
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There are essentially three propagation paths, excluding
the direct path, that can cause multipath effects in this
application.
* the surface reflecting path
* the bottom reflecting path
* paths due to the thermal microstructure in the water
Figure 41 shows the theoretical multipaths to the target,
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a. surface reflecting path
b. direct path
c . path due to microstructure in the water
d. bottom reflecting path
Figure 41. Propagation paths between transducer and target
The surface reflecting path is particularly important to
consider when the source and target lie at a shallow depth.
Because the path difference between the direct and reflected
wave path is small, the target is in the image interference
field where, depending on path differences, both waves'
intensities constructively or destructively interfere with
each other. This phenomena is very significant when the
surface is smooth and the incident grazing angle of the
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sound field is small. The surface then acts like a perfect
reflector. At increasing sea roughness and decreasing
wavelengths, the surface turns more and more to a scatterer,
which sends out the incident energy incoherent and in all
directions [Ref. 9].
The criterion for surface roughness is taken from
Clarence and Herman [Ref. 42]
R =
2 ir- H sin 9
X
where R = Rayleigh parameter
H = average wave height measured from peak to trough
9 a = incident angle measured from the horizontal
With H = 0.8 m (from Chapter 6), the incident angle 2 and
4 degrees and the wavelengths for 100 and 500 kHz yields the
data in Table 23 .









If R << 1, then the surface acts like a reflector and if
R >> 1, it acts like a scatterer. There is no doubt that in
both cases the surface acts like a scatterer.
The amplitude reflection coefficient of a rough surface
is
121
\x= e_2R [Ref . 43]
For the values of R above, the amplitude reflection
coefficients will all be approximately zero.
The conclusion is that there will be no measurable
effects at the target by the surface reflecting path.
The effects on a sea bottom reflected path are similar to
the sea surface reflection path, but more complex since the
sea bottom often consists of multilayered sediments,
together with a certain roughness.
The bottom profile with all its data was given in Chapter
6. In order to estimate the specular reflection, a
reflection coefficient diagram for this particular bottom is
developed in Appendix Q. When only considering the
geometrical bottom reflecting path (as shown above in Figure
40), incident grazing angels of 14 degrees (700 m) and 23
degrees (500 m) are found. Comparing these results from the
diagram in Appendix Q, a reflection coefficient of 1 is
found for 700 m range and 0.3 for 500 m range. The next step
is to examine how much the bottom roughness effects the
reflected wave. The bottom diagram gives an average height
between crest and trough of 5 meters. Calculating the
Rayleigh parameter R as above yields the figures in Table
24.










Since R>>1 in both cases, the surface is determined to be
very rough. Hence, the same expression for calculating the
reflection coefficient as given on page 121 is valid. With
the R sguared factor in the expression, the conclusion is
that, even in this case, the multipath effect from a bottom
reflection path at the target location can be neglected. A'
comparison, with the results above, can be done by using
Lambert's law for a very rough bottom. [Ref . 6] When using
this relationship no freguency dependence has been observed
for freguencies over 30 kHz. By using Figure 42 [Ref. 9],
the following eguation for the scattering intensity can be
shown:









Figure 42. Lambert's law for a
scattering surface
It can also be shown by integration that (ji is 1/t, if
all the incident acoustic energy is scattered into the upper
medium and no energy is lost by transmission into the bottom
(as in the 700m case) [Ref. 9]. This gives a specular
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surface reflection coefficient of 0.019, taking both
incident and reflecting angle to be 14 degrees. This result
supports the conclusion above that the bottom reflecting
path is negligible.
The third multipath cause to consider is due to the lack
of homogeneous sea temperatures that constantly change the
index of refraction. These temperature changes occur like
cells in the direct path between the source and target. Each
cell bends the sound ray differently, depending on the
launch angle. As a result, when they converge at the target,
multipath effects occur. Different equations estimating the
cell sizes and sound velocity deviation and their impact on
the transmitted pressure pulse are developed by Urick [Ref
.
9, 41]. There are no data available in order to do
estimations in this case.
In conclusion, the multipath results above support the
assumption that only the use of a direct sound path between
the source and the target is reliable in making a target
detection. Even if the interacting sound at the target
happens to be small, it is recommended that the vertical
beam pattern be minimized as much as possible to reduce both
the multipath and the back scattering (reverberation)
effects. When studying the ray diagrams in Appendix O, the
depression angle must be on the order of 10 degrees to
ensure the propagation of all direct rays. If no direct rays
can be found, the chances of detecting the target are very
small, despite some scattering into the shadow zones.
E. SONAR DESIGN: STEP 2
1. Back-scattering strength study
In active sonar systems, the returning echo signal
comprises both reflections from the target and reflections
from the sea surface, the sea bottom and from the water
volume. The undesired echo contribution is called
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reverberation and is a kind of noise, since it contains no
information. The reverberation is a fluctuating,
non-stationary process and an amplitude variation of 20-30
dB is common after transmitting the signal. The
reverberation amplitude is Rayleigh distributed and the
spectral shape is almost identical to the target signal
shape. Figure 43 shows an example of how a narrow band






iqure->43. Reverberation and target echo after transmitting
S00 nr pulse
The reverberation level depends, among other things, on
the scattering strength and the resolution element. Only
scattered sound in the resolution element, arriving at the
same time as the echo in the receiver, contributes to the
reverberation level. The back scattering strength is defined
(in dB) as the ratio of the intensity of sound scattered by
an area of 1 m or a volume of 1 cubic cm and the
intensity of the incident wave. It is important to
investigate what regions in the ocean contribute to the
total scattering strength. In this case the back scattering
situation can be depicted as in Figure 44. This is taken to
be the worst case (in January, when multiple regions are
involved) [Ref . 9 ]
.
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The following back scattering regions will be further
investigated:
* Surface scattering: surface reflection and bottom
reflection
* Surface scattering by a layer of volume scatterers:
air bubbles down to 3 meters depth and fish density






Figure 44. The back scattering regions
The surface scattering for both the sea surface and
the sea bottom, has already been investigated in this
chapter. The fact that the surfaces are very rough compared
to the wavelengths, makes them "scatterers" and the sound is
scattered out in all directions incoherently. The sea
surface reflection coefficient gives unmeasurably small
values when using the Rayleigh scattering model above. The
conclusion is that, when using this model, the back
scattering contribution is negligible. The Rayleigh model
gives the same small reflection coefficient for the sea
bottom which also implies negligible back scattering there.
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Using the Lambert's Law model instead gives the following
equation:
SR = 10 logn1 + 10 log sin -9
where n = 1/ ir [Ref. 9]
For a grazing angle of 10 degrees, the scattering
coefficient becomes -20 dB.
Urick [Ref. 9] gives values for bottom scattering
strengths vice grazing angles that are based on many
measurements and frequencies up to 100 kHz (Figure 45), but
does not indicate bottom roughness.
Figure 45. Bottom backscattering strength
as a function of grazing angle
A 10 degree grazing angle gives S Q = - 38 dB for
clay.
The values above are quite far from each other. Since
the speed of sound gradients, during most of the year, are
negative, the sound waves are most often bending down toward
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the bottom. Hence, the bottom scattering region is more
important to consider than the sea surface. Therefore, a
worst case value of -20 dB will be assigned as the total
back scattering from both surfaces.
"Surface scattering with layer of volume scatterers"
models can be used when there are scatterers in layers, such
as bubbles and fish. However, instead of calculating a
volume scattering situation, the finite layer concept makes






= Sv + 10 * log H [Ref . 9]
where H = layer depth
Air bubbles are most frequently located in a layer
near the surface, and their sizes and numbers depends on the
agitation of the sea surface (wind and waves) and the water
(fresh water, ocean water, coastal water, etc.). No measured
values of bubble sizes and densities have been available for
the Baltic, so an estimation must be made. Clarence and
Herman [Ref. 42 :p. 173] show a figure that summarizes bubble
content in water determined by experiments.
For coastal waters there is an average of 10
bubbles per cubic meters at 3 . 3 meters. Their sizes reach
from 1 m to 40 m, so an average size of 20 m will be used
for the calculations. The bubbles' back scattering can be









= scattering cross section
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n = bubbles /yd-3 [Ref . 9]












= bubble resonant frequency
£ = damping constant [Ref. 9]
Further, the bubbles' resonance frequency must be
calculated according to the following equation:
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|
f r = >| 1 + 0.03 d
(3)
where d = depth in feet [Ref .9]
To compute the scattering cross section in Equation 2,
the damping constant of air bubbles in water must be
determined. This damping constant is a measure of the
dissipation process in the bubbles and is the reciprocal of
the bubbles' Q (Quality factor). Figure 46 gives the
theoretical damping of resonant bubbles in water [Ref. 9] .
Using Equation 3 with the values for bubble radius and
the depth indicated above, the bubble resonant frequency is
186 kHz. Then calculating the scattering cross section for
both frequencies (100 and 500 kHz) together with a damping
constant of 0.1 gives:
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For 100 kHz <?
s
= 8.3 * 10" 6
For 500 kHz <J s = 6.7 * 10"
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Converting these values into a surface scattering case
gives
:
For 100 kHz S
a
= -31.8 + 10 log 3.3 = -26.6 dB
For 500 kHz S
a
= -22.7 + 10 log 3.3 = -17.5 dB
The scattering strength for fish population can be
computed in the same way as above by using Equation 1. No
measured values for the fish average size and population
density in the Baltic have been found, so even in this case
an estimation must be made. In Lake Michigan in the United
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States, fish density samples have been taken for various
depths and locations. An average fish density of 5.7 *
10 fishes per cubic meter has been computed for this
lake. [Ref . 42] Even if the Baltic has brackish water and
Lake Michigan has fresh water, this is the best estimation
we have. Using the diagram in Urick '[Ref • 9 : Figure 9 . 19 ] ;
the target strength (TS) for a particular fish length and
transmitting freguency is given. The transmitting frequency
dependence on the TS is very weak, compared to the size of
the fish. The Baltic has no really big fish as in the deep
oceans. Cod, salmon and herring are some good
representatives of the population. Based on this, an average
fish size of 7 inches is adopted. Using the diagram in the
reference for 100 kHz gives a TS of -40 dB per fish. Using
Equation 1 and noting that
<7 s
TS = 10* log yields
4 T
Sv = 10 *log 5.7 * 10"
3
+ (-40) = -62.4 dB
Assuming this fish density is true in the whole water
column (100 m) gives:
S
s
= - 62.4 + 10 log 100 = - 42.4 dB
No TS value for 500 kHz is indicated in the reference.
In conclusion, the scattering regions in Table 25 will
be taken into account:
TABLE 25. SCATTERING REGIONS
Bottom region -20 dB for both frequencies
Bubble region -26.6 dB for 100 kHz
-17.5 dB for 500 kHz
Fish region -42.4 dB for 100 kHz
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In order to get a total backscatter level, these
values must be adjusted in a diagram like the one in Figure
47 [Ref . 37]
.
This gives the final back scattering strengths:
S
s (100 kHz) = -19.1 dB
S
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Figure 47. Curve for summation of levels. L^-i. = LI +
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2. Beamwidth calculation
This section will utilize the sonar parameters
determined above and first calculate the horizontal
beamwidth and then the required transducer size. The
reference transducer (circular and 1 meter in diameter) will
still be used in the initial calculations, but after a
sensitivity analysis regarding the target strength (TS) has
been performed, other transducer sizes and shapes will be
discussed.
The active sonar equation with surface reverberation
limited performance yields [Ref. 32]:
RL = SL - 2TL + 10 log r + S Q + 10 log (9ct/2)
where = horizontal beamwidth
r = pulse length
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The equation will be solved for 9, after determining
the reverberation level according to Figure 36 on page 99.
Then the following equation will be used for the sensitivity-
analysis [Ref . 32]
:
TS = Sa + 10 log r + 10 log( 9cr/2) + DT
where TS is the target strength of the mine.
A best choice of sonar parameters will be determined
under the calculation process. The goal is to come up with
rough values for a transducer size and shape that fulfills
the major sonar objective. All calculations are carried out
in Appendix Q and only the results will be shown here. The
first step is to calculate the noise floor level (NL - DI),
where DI is the directivity index for the reference
transducer. The noise floor level yields:
for 100 kHz 23.6 dB
for 500 kHz 9 . 6 dB
These noise levels are now taken to be the required
reverberation levels (according to Figure 36 on page 99.)
The second step is to calculate the necessary source
levels in order to get the required detection ranges and to
calculate the required horizontal beamwidths as shown in
Table 26.
TABLE 26. DETECTION RANGES AND BEAMWIDTHS








Noting that the reference transducer gives horizontal
bearawidths of 1.397 degrees for 100 kHz and 0.556 degrees
for 500 kHz we can conclude that satisfying the sonars
required range, is possible. In addition, given the decrease
in sonar size requirements, other objectives, simple
logistics and low cost, for example; become possible once
the carrier frequency is determined. Since 100 kHz gives
beamwidth values that makes the transducer sizes reasonable,
this lower frequency is preferred from a hardware point of
view. Further, since the primary goal is to detect a mine at
a distance of 700 meters, a 1.397 degrees beamwidth is
acceptable.
The third step is to vary the target strength versus
beamwidth, and to make a conclusion of a realistic target
strength, using parameters from a "real" mine. From the
calculations in Appendix Q, pages 4 and 5, a target strength
of +5 dB is determined. A beamwidth of 4.423 degrees is then
adequate, which means that the circular transducer can be
reduced from a diameter of 1 meter to 0.22 meters. The
necessary SL and DI will now change to 168.5 dB and 33.3 dB
.
The horizontal beamwidth requirement has now been met,
but the vertical beamwidth is left to be considered. The
section on multipath propagation indicates that the vertical
beamwidth must be at least 25 degrees in order to utilize
all the direct paths to the target (considering the whole
year)
.
Since a circular transducer creates a pencil beam,
this will not give an appropriate beam pattern. There is a
possibility, of course, to use a pencil beam and then scan
through the required search volume both vertically and
horizontally. This takes time however, and the scan time
must be made as short as possible. The original reason for
choosing a circular transducer was a trade off between
maximum transducer size (1 meter), practical handling and
sonar dome shape. Since the sizes now turn out to be much
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smaller, a planar array or aperture is an option. The
advantage of a planar aperture is that a vertical beamwidth
of 25 degrees is possible to achieve, together with a narrow
horizontal beamwidth (fan beam). The following approximate




where BW(h) = horizontal beamwidth
BW(v) = vertical beamwidth
LI = transducer width
L2 = transducer length
For the beamwidths above, a rectangular planar
transducer will measure a length of 0.2 meters and a width
of 0.04 meters. The new values for the directivity index and
source level yields 25.5 dB and 176.3 dB
.
The next question is, "Is it possible to transmit a SL
of 176.3 dB with that aperture size due to the cavitation
threshold?" When a transducer is excited, cavitation bubbles
are developed on the front of the transducer.
"These bubbles are a manifestation of the rupture of the
water caused by the negative pressures of the generated
sound field. These negative pressures tear the liquid
apart, so to speak, when they exceed a certain value
called the cavitation threshold. [Ref. 9:p. 76]
The cavitation threshold can be calculated using the
following equation [Ref. 9]:
I
c
= 0.3 * p W/cm 2
where l
c
= cavitation threshold, W/cm2
p = peak pressure of sound wave causing cavitation
( in atm)
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The p value is determined by Urick [Ref . 9:Figure 4.6]
for 100 kHz to be 2 atm (worst case). This gives a
cavitation threshold of 1.2 W/cm 2 . With a transducer area
of 80 cnr , the maximum power is 96 W. Using the following
equation solves for the source level:
SL = 10 log P + DI + 171 re 1 Pa
where P = power in W
With a DI of 25.5 dB re 1 Pa, the maximum source
level will be 216 dB. Since the required source level is far
under this level, the bubble cavitation is not a problem.
The calculations above have utilized the limiting
value for the reverberation which occurs when the echo
changes from being masked by noise to being masked by
reverberation. Increasing the power further will not
influence the range but only emphasize the reverberation
limited performance. In an actual design it might be
advisable to increase the SL for hardware reasons since a SL
of 176.3 dB gives very low power values (0.01 W)
.
F. TRANSDUCER STUDY
The transducer can be designed as a planar array or a
planar aperture. The advantage of using an array technique
is that FFT beamforming and beamsteering can be utilized and
the array itself need not to be scanned inside the dome. An
array consist of many small transducer elements which must
be amplitude and phase weighted together. This implies a
more sophisticated signal processing technique. One
disadvantage, in this case, is that the wavelength is only
0.015 meters for 100 kHz. When considering beamsteering with
an array, the transducer elements must be spaced at a
distance less then 1/2 wavelength in order to avoid grating
lobes. This means that the element spacing must be less than
0.0075 meters. Narrow spacing can give unwanted radiation
coupling between the elements. Also, in order for the
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elements to act like point sources (which makes the beam
pattern prediction easier), the element length must be small
compared to a wavelength. In this case this means fractions
of a millimeter. These facts makes a choice of a steerable
array technique very difficult to pursue. However, an array
technique might still be utilized in an unsteerable mode',
where no phase weighting is performed. To simplify the
calculations a planar aperture is chosen for the further
transducer design.
The directivity function of a planar aperture can be
calculated by taking the two dimensional spatial Fourier
transformation of the transducer aperture function. The
aperture function is the frequency response of the planar
aperture, when it is excited by an input electrical signal.
The directivity function is simply the beam pattern of the
transducer. The aperture function is normally a complex
function, but since, in this case, no beam steering will be
used, only the amplitude window (real part) needs to be
considered. There are many different amplitude windows to
chose from and only a few of them have a closed form
solution. It is important in probably all sonar designs to
suppress the sidelobes in order to minimize the effects of
noise and other unwanted signals. The design then becomes a
trade off between the beamwidth and the sidelobe level
(SLL), since normally suppressing the sidelobes broadens the
beamwidth. A broadening of the mainbeam must be compensated
with larger aperture size. Since the size in the design is
relatively small, an increase in transducer size is
recommended to get low sidelobes. Therefore a Blackman
window is chosen as the amplitude window function. This
choice results in a sidelobe suppression of -58 dB . A one




1x)=(0.42 + 0.5 cos(§ x/L) + 0.08 cos(4 x/L)) rect(L)
where x = transducer in the x direction, i.e., a linear
aperture
L = length of the aperture
rect(L) = rectangular window, i.e., a constant.
This one dimensional case can be extended into two
dimensions, i.e., a planar aperture. The development of a
planar aperture directivity function is shown in Appendix R.
The problems to physically manufacture an aperture with a
Blackman window response will not be discussed here.
In order to compute the beam pattern, the measurements of
the aperture must first be computed. The aperture size can
be determined by using the following equation:
-1
A6
: = 2sin •
Au
where Au = 3dB beamwidth in direction cosine space
AS = horizontal beamwidth (in this case)
and A u = 1.6444 X /L
where L = transducer length
Using this equation with the required horizontal and
vertical beamwidths yields an aperture width of 0.319 meters
and a height of 0.057 meters. The directivity index (DI) and
the required source level stay approximately the same, that
is 25.5 dB and 176.3 dB, since the mainlobe beamwidths have
not been changed.
In order to make sure that the target is in the far
field, the range to the far field must be computed. The
following equation can be used [Ref . 33]
:
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J L 2 J [2
For more details see Appendix R.
The range to the far field is 0.16 meters. Since this is
much less than 700 meters, the target is in the far field.
The closed-form solution for the normalized directivity
function of the Blackman window is shown in Appendix R.
Appendix R also shows the computed directivity function
or beam pattern for the aperture.
The planar aperture must cover a sector of 20 degrees.
With a beamwidth of 4.423 degrees at 700 meters, the
aperture must be able to turn ±7.8 degrees from the ahead
direction (Figure 48).
G. DESIGN SUMMARY
The original objective was to design a sonar with the
ability to detect a mine at a distance great enough to allow
an avoiding maneuver. In addition, the sonar must fulfill
"practical" objectives like size, cost and logistic
handling. Different design approaches have been taken
according to these objectives. Each approach had strengths
and weakness whose relative importance had to be evaluated.
One weak aspect of the resulting design is the lack of
139
Figure 48. Transducer scan pattern
"real" measured values for parameters such as back
scattering strength and target strength. The design, then,
is based on the "reasonableness" of the estimates used. One
strong aspect is that it is possible to achieve a practical
solution for the given sonar objectives, despite the very
complex water environment. In order to achieve a sonar
design that allows ship operation the entire year, much more
research and measurements must be done in the real
environment. The sonar design result is summarized in Table
27 on the next page.
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TABLE 27. SONAR DESIGN RESULT
Carrier frequency: 100 kHz
Source level
:
>176.3 dB re 1 \x Pa
Transducer size: 0.32 X 0.06 meters
Sidelobe level
:





4.4 (H) X 25 degrees (V),










Sonar depth: 10 meters
Sonar scan: ±7.8 degrees, against
head direction
141









i _^^ H ,
•» 10 »o *o w
i
142










APPENDIX B. CRASH STOP AHEAD TEST
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APPENDIX C. CRASH STOP ASTERN TEST
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APPENDIX D. MODIFIED ZIP-ZAG TEST
1 . :~i. ;-. J.'-; Kfj :





.:: :;: ::::-..-. • .:::;;
j [..;;.
!: ' / ! U-(S) :.- -N^f:.- !: T:J^ivi M'.-F ! i-.i ! !,>!
1
- , «A rs "rr— : p-f-v - : —ir ,->\i -- «—»i ' «-(^v :;: -i-r— ^ — -












t r .tdcri! -- : - ; i - -1 . i -l ! •-:-.-
: BALLAST COnOmiTN m"2ND ScA TR:AL)
-—
i-
. : ; i : : i : ! 1 i 'i
: FltST HELH AuirCE ! 'sTAZJ.OPXD fOfiT • . ;
ENGikE LcAO | HOkMAL fr"W.HAL
DATE 1 OCT 31, ifTJ OCT. SI I97J 1
UEA7HER :&itf 5*7" »>V» CF 'ACHEO Cioopz
HiHO
,
FA/E - ? ENE - 2
S£fl con01 riON ! IHOOTH 5H60TH






5HAfT a P H 1 92 ?2 -
- -; <
.-r-. :»-.-$ >f*c Zh*'>:-£ /•
e -:/<— f*i :-'£ TH'S '!"»;;;- .-.,.-*?£ ~V'<LE _.
.




:(-.-) (.->>> 1 1 - <• V
WISH
-HIPS- fi&>/> *-r*~ ?" -
146
APPENDIX E. TURNING TEST
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APPENDIX F. REVERSED SPIRAL TEST
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APPENDIX H. CALCULATION OF PULSE DENSITY
Let the height of the emitter and the ESM antenna be
h : = 1 ' m
3
The radar horizon limited LOS is :-
R : = 2 1.23 (nm) h
j s
i . e R = 26 km
f t m.
The separation between ships at sea is assumed to average :
= 5 nm
sep








If the fraction of ships that are military is : -
f : = 0.1
Then the number of civilian and military ships are :-
N : = ( 1 - i ) X
C T
and N := t • N
M T
The number of radars (assuming one per civilian ship and two per military
ship is : -
n : = >J 2 N i.e. n =
R C M R





and N = 2
long
For the 3hort, medium and long ranges, we can determine the PP.Fs for
maximum range without ambiguity. Let the various ranges b9 :-







APPENDIX H (page 2)
hen the ccr re spend 1 ng ??.rs are determined from
c 1a -
1






The nusiber of radars in each range type (1 - short, 3 - long) are
n : = N + N « N
1 C M coast
n : = N
2 M
and n := N
3 long
The n-:r.ber of radars in each category are :
n
l
io] totall mg V n =30
-




total 1 i n i 5 3 5 7 Hz
1 i
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APPENDIX I. MAP OVER THE BALTIC SEA
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APPENDIX M. SPEED OF SOUND PROFILES WITH RAY TRACING
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APPENDIX M (page 4)
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APPENDIX M (page 6)
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APPENDIX M (page 9)
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APPENDIX M (page 10)
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APPENDIX M (page 12)
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APPENDIX 0. KNUDSEN'S CURVES FOR AMBIENT NOISE
X3
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APPENDIX P. MISC. CURVES AND DIAGRAMS
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APPENDIX Q. BEAM PATTERN CALCULATIONS
Calculating NL - DI
.
NL := 70 dB re 1 uPa (combining NSL(A) , NSL(S) and within
840 Hz bandwith.
)
DI for reference transducer yields:
k := ..1




circular with radius 0.5 meter



















APPENDIX Q (page 2)
Determining the Source Level ( SL)
SL = RL + 2*TL - TS +




















20- logTr ' + a -












SL for 100 kHz and 500 m range
SL for 100 kHz and 700 m range
SL for 500 kHz and 500 m range
SL for 500 kHz and 700 m range
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APPENDIX Q (page 3)
Determining the horizontal beamwith.
Using expression for surface reverberation in ref [34] p. 425


















58.9 -19.1 500 100 kHz
63.9 -19.1 700 100 kHz
104 -15.1 500 500 kHz
126.9 -15.1 700 500 kHz
e(k)
BW













Beam widths in degrees for
10 kHz and range 500 m
100 kHz and range 700 m
500 kHz and range 500 m
500 kHz and range 700 m
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APPENDIX Q (page 4)
Sensitivity analysis; Varying the TS to
investigate the performance limitations.
k := -25 ..12 Target Strength variation
SA := -19.1 Scattering strength
DT := 9 Detection threshold
k-SA-DT-10- log(700)






































APPENDIX Q (page 5)
Calculating an assumed TS based on
a mine with a cylindrical form and with
a tactical aspect angle normal to the
axis of the cylinder. The mine parameters
are taken from an Italicn mine, the
"SEPPIA" made by the Misar company.
TS formula for cylindrical shape [u]:
TS = 10 * log(a*L"2/(2*u))




TS := 10 log
2 X
TS 12.891 dB
This value is probably to high for a real mine, since one can expect
different kinds of TS reductions (see chapter 3.x) to be utilized.
Including TS reduction measures and variations in the aspect angle, a TS of
5 dB can be reasonable to assume.







































So optimizing for a TS of 5 dB, a transducer with a diameter of
0.22 meters is required.
Recalculation for new required values for necessary SL and
DI gives:
SL = 138.534 dB
DI = 3 3.3 dB
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APPENDIX R. BEAMWIDTH CALCULATIONS
Calculating horizontal and vertical beam pattern for a planar aperture with
a Blackman amplitude window.
The aperture function for a planar aperture with separable functions (the
aperture function can be written as a product of two functions) and with
Blackman amplitude weighting used for both functions yields:
A(f,x,y) = Black(Lx) * Black(Ly)
The normalized directivity function or beam pattern yields:
D(f,fx,fy) = Dx(f,fx) * D(f,fy)
Calculating horizontal beampattern: (set v = 0,(see next page) which
yields D(f,fy) = 1)
z
x := 0.015





Where u = sin e * cos
D(f,fx,fy) = Dx(f,fx) gives:
1.1.68 - 0.18 (L fx(u)) J sin(n L fx(u)
D(u) :=








where u (direction cosinus) = sin 9 * sin ^
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APPENDIX R (page 2)




v := -1,-0.999 . .1
fy(v) := - Where v = sin 9 * sin 4»
X
D(f,fx,fy) = D(f,fy) gives:
I"
2
1Ll.68 - 0.18- (L- fy(v) ) J sin(rv L- fy(v) )
D(v) :=












Where v (direction cosine ) = sin 8 * siny
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